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1.
"ORIGIN'S Or TEE ENTEITT? COEDI . OF 1904"
1 . Introduction
A diplomatic revolution took place in 1904 through the
Anglo-French nlliar.ce concluded in that year. It is memorable,
not alone for its far reaching after affects upon world diplomacy,
but in tracing its origins, we find the whole tangled web of Europe's
economic, philosophical, and political developments in the latter
part of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century.
I'ore than that, its roots take us into practically all corners of the
earth in an effort to locate and interpret the forces lying behind
each nation's needs, fears, and policies.
It will be necessary to lay the largest stress upon the
background of these developments, and then the agreements themselves,
reached in the Anglo-French understanding, will be practically self-
explanatory.
My purpose will be to make a comprehensive survey of the
many factors underlying this subject, rather than an intensive, de-
tailed treatment of any one side. Traditional Anglo-French rivalry
will be outlined down to its modern aspects. There will be a resume
#
of British, French, and German foreign policy with its underlying
economic basis and clashing imperialistic interests. An attempt will
be made to evaluate the elements which led both England and France
to distrust German aggressiveness and draw near to each other by a
mutual settlement of outstanding difficulties. The steps leading up
to this settlement will be traced and the terms of the bargain it-
self discussed. There will be a sketch of those persons most res-
ponsible for its consummation and a brief review of a few of the more
important general results in its effect upon European diplomacy.

2II E K
1. Anglo-French Rivalry -- Traditional
We can understand at the present time how this Entente
was a natural outcome of existing conditions, but a casual glance
hack through the six centuries of hitter rivalry makes it seem to
the uninitiated all the more remarkable. This is especially true if
they do not understand that it has been a precedent with England,
since she first emerged as a powerful nation, to change sides as
interest dictated in order to wield a balance of power and main-
tain commercial and naval supremacy.
Anglo-French rivalry in the fourteenth century manifested
itself in the Hundred Years War. Feudal and political issues were
but lesser causes, the main questions being nationalistic and econ-
omic. It was largely a fight for the growing tendency toward nation-
alism and unity in each state, coupled with the desire for economic
control of Flanders.
Later, during the age of the Tudor s, England emerged as a
definite factor in Continental* politics, being a balance between the
Hapsburg Emperor Charles V and Francis I of France. Also in the
following rivalries between France and Spain, she allied herself
with one side and then the other. Finally religious antagonism,
but more especially questions of trade caused her to definitely
break with Spain. T- e repulse of the Armada marked the beginning of
the end of Spanish sea power and the rise of English supremacy.
During the Stuart period with its struggle between King
and Parliament and the commercial rivalry with the Dutch, England
and France maintained comparatively friendly relations until after
the Glorious Revolution of 1588 and a breaking of the Dutch monopoly
of the carrying trade.

3Then came the supremacy of France on the Continent,
(built up largely through the efforts of Cardinal Richelieu)
her rise as a sea power, and the establishment of a large colonial
empire. Once more the old rivalry flared up anc there followed
the Second Hundred Years War or series of wars. They were begun
in opposition to the ascendancy of Louis XIV which threatened
the European balance of power. They were continued as a colon-
ial and commercial struggle and were fought out in America, the
West Indies, India, and on the sea as well as on the Continent.
They ended with a return of the old struggle for European equil-
ibrium as well as commercial interests in the Napoleonic wars.
England's commerce and colonial empire had grown at the
expense of Spain, then Holland, and now France. However, the hostil-
ity of the eighteenth century was tempered in the nineteenth until
there was official friendliness, varying at different times in
degree of cordiality, but never reaching open hostility in spite
of several crises, such as the Four Power Treaty guaranteeing
the integrity of the Ottoman Empire in 1840 and trouble over the
marriage question of the young Spanish queen in 1846. To be sure,
England and France cooperated in the Crimean War in 1854, but the
alliance was only temporary and friction became intense again
over the colonial question in different parts of the world, cul-
minating in the Fashoda affair of 1898.
iinglo-French Rivalry I.'odern Imperialistic
This growing tension between the two countries in the last
1. War of the Palatinate 1689-97, Spanish Succession 1702-13,
Austrian Succession 1740-48, Seven Years V; ar 1755-63, Ameri-
can Revolution (French entrance) 1778-83 and the French revol-
ution and Napoleonic V/ars 1793-1815. In all these France and
England were on opposite sides.

4quarter of the nineteenth century was expressed by Lord Lyons in
June 1884 when he wrote from France: "The two nations come into
contact in every part of the globe. In every part of it questions
arise which in the present state of feeling excite mutual sus-
2
picion and irritation."
The oldest question was probably that of the Newfound-
land fishing rights dating from the Treaty of Utrecht 1713. Then
too, the French penal colony of New Caledonia was very obnoxious
to the British in Queensland and there were also rival claims of
sovereignty over the Hew Hebrides islands.
Furthermore, French and English commercial interests
clashed in the island of Madagascar. Keen rivalry was also felt
in ^sia over expansion in Siamese territory. Besides this question
there had been misunderstanding concerning the adjustment of claims
in the hinterland of the Higer ard Congo basins.
Perhaps the greatest friction was caused by strained
relations over the control of Egypt and the Egyptian Sudan.
The beginning of the twentieth century brought the situation in
Morocoo to an acute stage also.
So we see that the modern imperialistic policies of
Britain and France were clashing in the Oceanic islands, in .sia,
and in both north and central Africa.
2. Egerton H E "British Foreign Policy in Europe", p. 339quotes "Life of Lord Granville* Vol.11 p. 333

52. OUTLINE OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE LAST QUARTER OF
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
General Resume*
For the first three quarters of the nineteenth century,
Britain enjoyed a position of uncontested supremacy. She had
developed into a huge factory, was confident in her economic and
industrial prosperity and proud of her wealth which made London
the financial capital of the world. She owned rich tropical lands
and settlement colonies in temperate zones. She had an unrivalled
merchant marine and a powerful navy which commanded the sea
routes by means of many strategic naval stations and bound the
Empire together as well as protecting and defending the scattered
dominions
.
Thus, British interests tended more toward democratizing
England and working out a system of Imperial control for the lands
already secured, than in adding more colonies or entering into
Continental affairs.
The two leading factors in British foreign policy had been
to protect the Empire by maintaining commercial and naval supremacy
over the trade lanes of the world, especially those leading to the
East vrtiere India v/as considered the "jewel of the Empire", and
secondly, to oppose any attempt made to overthrow a balance of
power in Europe. This last, she had discarded, temporarily, at
least, since after the Congress of Vienna the equilibrium in
Furore was maintained for over half a century through a concert of
power among the nations.
In the last half of the nineteenth century, after

6the death of Palmerston in 1865, British policy reflects the control
of three outstanding statesmen, Gladstone, Disraeli, and Salisbury.
The Liberals, under Gladstone, were concerned primarily
with domestic legislation—internal reforms for England and the
Irish question. They were "Little Knglanders" or anti-imperialists.
Conservative interests, under Lisraeli, looked beyond
Britain to overseas dominions and imperialistic aspirations. Ex-
amples of their activity within a period of only four years may
be found in the annexation of the Fiji Islands 1874, purchase of
the Suez Canal shares 1875 and the establishment of the Dual Con-
trol over Egyptian finances 1876, Victoria made Empress of Irdia
1876 and a protectorate declared over Baluchistan in the same year,
the Transva 1 annexed 1877, and Cyprus gained in 1878. Llodern im-
perialistic desires had been aroused and furthered by the writings
of such men as Dilke , Seeley, Froude, Kipling, Sir Harry Johnston,
and the founding of the Imperial Federation League in 1884 through
the efforts of Forster.
Aloofness from Continental affairs could not continue,
for other nations entered the competition for empire and Britain,
under Salisbury's leadership, found it necessary to defend her
monopoly and adjust territorial friction arising in all parts of
the world. Salisbury as an "internationally-minded" statesman
realized that in order to accomplish proper adjustments while still
maintaining the peace of Europe and also British supremacy, a
policy of caution toward coalitions and alliances was essential.
This policy has been translated into the famous phrase "splendid
isolation.
"
•
7SPECIFIC OUTLINE
In tracing the factors which led to the abandonment of
the above mentioned policy, a starting point may be made with the
changed conditions in Europe following the Franco-Prussian War of
1870 and the hegemony of the new German Empire in Europe.
Prussia and England had been traditional friends and
allies, as France and England had been enemies, and it was Bismarck's
policy to keep the relation as such. Germany had no colonial empire
to rival the British and Bismarck's declaration that Germany was a
"satiated state" with plenty of problems at home, lulled British
fears for the early part of the last quarter of the century.
Twice during the decade 1870-80, Bismarck made tentative
overtures to Disraeli (Lord Beaconsfield ) concerning the possibility
of tin alliance. The first attempt was in 1875, the year of the
Franco-German v/ar scare, and again in September 1879 before the
iiUStro-German pact, it was suggested that England join and make it
1
a Triple Alliance, v/hich was refused.
The first definite emergence of England in Continental
politics during this period was in connection with the reopening
of the Eastern question by the Russo-Turkish v/ar in 1877. In this
crisis England acted in concert with other European nations (but
no binding alliances) to maintain the status quo in Constantinople
and overturn Russian gains in the San Stefano treaty.
For years it had been a part of England's policy to up-
hold the Ottoman Empire as a bulv/ark against Russian aggression
threatening the control of English routes to the East. The treaty
1. Ward and Gooch "Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy"
Vol. Ill p. 144-7

Bof San Stefano between Russia and Tux-key March 3, 1878, discrim-
inated against the interests of some of the Balkan states in
favor of those under Russian influence and an oversized Bulgaria was
created which was directly under Russian control. Immediate pro-
tests from all the powers whose interests were at stake led to the
Congress of Berlin in June and July 1878. Salisbury defined
English policy toward Turkey in a letter to the English Ambassa-
dor at Vienna: "All practicable support should be given to races
which are likely to act as barriers to the advance of the Slavon-
2
ic Power."
There followed a general territorial readjustment and
the results were that Russia came away embittered against Germany
and England as well as against Austria; England had received Cyprus
by a convention with Turkey June 4, 1878, and Austria and Germany
drew together in a Dual Alliance leading to that system of counter
alliances which dominated European politics from then to the A'orld
.Var and still continues.
' During the decade 1880-90 the thoughts of practically
all the European nations turned to colonial affairs. It was the
time of feverish colonization in ^frica, Asia, and the islands
of the Pacific, ^.mong other acquisitions England had occupied
Egypt. Because of gaining predominant interest in the Suez Canal
in 1875, securing Cyprus 1878, and practical control of Egypt
1885, England could disregard as vital the friction which arose
2. Ibid. p. 134
%
gwith the Sultan, for she had now secured her own key to the East
and no longer needed to pursue her polic?/ of supporting the
Ottoman Empire. This gave Germany an opportunity to secure a
3
predominant influence there which we shall follow out later.
The period 1880-98 was occupied largely with the ad-
justment of colonial conflicts and with a friendly cooperation
with the Triple Alliance as against Franco and Russo-British riv-
alry.
The first of the colonial settlements was on July 3, 1880
when conflicting commercial interests in Morocco led to the Con-
ference of Madrid, which declared the independence of Morocco
and guaranteed the most-favored-nation treatment to all signatories
of the agreement. The opening of the interior of the Congo region
and the necessity for regulating international interests in Cen-
tral Africa, led to the Colonial Conference of Berlin 1884-5. Also
in 1885 there was an Anglo-German agreement relative to Southwest
African claims of the two nations.
On November 22, 1887, Bismarck wrote a personal letter to
Salisbury inviting England to form an alliance with Germany's two
allies, Austria and Italy, for the preservation of the status quo
4
in the Near East. Salisbury was disinclined to make a formal
compact, but concluded a Mediterranean agreement for friendly co-
operation with Austria and Italy to insure the status quo in the
Mediterranean and Black Seas.
5
By 1889 BoulanRism had created a tension between France
3. See page 48-57
4. Hammann, Otto. "The florid Policy of Germany" p. 255. See page 19-^0
*
10
and Germany; Russia had been made antagonistic by the publishing
6
in 1888 of the terms of the Aus tro-German alliance and. was
drawing closer to France, while both France and Russia had con-
flicting colonial interests with England. It seemed an auspicious
moment to tempt England to an alliance, so on January 11, 1889
Bismarck instructed Count Eatzfeldt, the Ambassador to London, to
open confidential negotiations with Salisbury. *n March, Count
Herbert Bismarck was sent to London to discuss the offer. Ger-
many 1 s argument was that "the peace of Europe can best be secured
by a treaty between Germany and England pledging them to mutual
support against a French attack. A secret treaty would ensure
success in such a war, but its publication would prevent the war.
Neither France nor Russia will break the peace if they know for
7
certain that they have England against them."
However, Salisbury, according to his policy, refused a
binding compact and the question was shelved in his reply, "Mean-
while we leave it on the table without saying yea or no. That
8
is, unfortunately, all I can do at present."
In June 1890 there followed, not an alliance, but an-
other evidence of friendly adjustment in the Zanzibar-Heligoland
agreement. This determined the respective spheres of both nations
in East Africa and recognized a British protectorate over Zanzibar
in return for ceding Heligoland to Germany. The value of Heligo-
land had not been adequately realized in England,—an estimate
6. See page 27
7. Gooch, G. P. "Bermany" p. 44
8. Gooch, G. P. loc,cit.

11
on fortifications had been 2, 000, 000 which was thought too high
for a small island that was likely to disappear beneath the sea.
Also in 1890 a treaty was signed with France relative
to the lands of the Niger and recognizing a French protectorate
over Madagascar, while France confirmed the English protectorate
over Zanzibar. Friction arose in 1893 over Siam (settled tempor-
arily January 15, 1896) while at the same time another African
agreement was made with Germany—West Africa. The following
year the Anglo-Congolese treaty (May 12, 1894) caused a protest
from both France and Germany, but English aspirations for a
north-south route through Africa to facilitate tbe Cape-to-Cairo
railroad project and frustrate the French west-east hopes of
linking their colonies, led to the plans for the reconquest of
9
the Sudan and the Grey delcaration of March 28, 1895.
During this time, internal troubles in Turkey and the
massacres which took place in nsia Minor led England to fear
that a dissolution of the Ottoman Empire v/as imminent. ^ome
secret discussion on the subject of a possible partition of the
Empire was carried on between London and Berlin, the nature of
10
which is not very definite. The German Government under Eol-
11
stein's influence feared that Salisbury's object was to involve
the Continent in wars and have someone else pull her chestnuts
out of the fire for her, so Eatzfeldt was not authorized to
12
enter into negotiations.
9. See page 22
10. Ward and Gooch. op. cit. p. 275, also Brandenburg, Erich.
"From Bismarck to the .Vorld War." p. 23
11. Baron von Hoi stein—head of the political division of the
Foreign Office. Count Hatzfeldt—German Ambassador at Court
of St. Jan:es. Lord Salisbury—British Premier and Foreign
Minister both--1895-1900
12. Brandenburg, Erich, op. cit. p71, also Hamman, Otto op. cit. p. 64
%
12
Interest was soon drawn away from this as matters in the
Far East claimed the attention of the European powers, following the
Treaty of Shimoneseki, April 1, 1895, Imposed on China by Japan.
During the beginning of the struggle (October 1894) England had sug-
gested Joint intervention which was unfavorably received. She had
feared the collapse of the Chinese Empire resulting in detriment to
British trade and she also wished to maintain China as a bulwark
against Russian aggression in eastern Asia. Later, she saw that her
trade was suffering very little and as Japan was a powerful, rising
power, she did not wish to alienate her, thinking to gain more from
her friendship. With this apparently in mind, she refused to Join
with Germany, Russia, and France in intervening after the treaty and
so she paved the way for the Anglo-Jap alliance of 1902.
From Asia we must go back to Africa. Trouble was brewing
in South Africa and the Jameson Raid January 1, 1896 focused all eyes
on that part of the world. The famous congratulatory Kruger t elegram
sent by the Kaiser on January 3, after consultation with three of his
Ministers, has been preceded by an approach to France on the ques-
tion of cooperation with Germany in colonial matters in view of the
14
continuous expansion of the British Empire.
Public opinion In England considered t his Incident an un-
warrantable interference in her internal affairs and feeling became
extremely hostile toward Germany. However, it was the first step
toward waking In diplomatic circles the fear that her serene policy
of Isolation between the Triple and Dual Alliances was becoming
13. See page
14. Brandenburg, Erich, op. cit. p. 83 quotes Instructions to Count
Munster January 1, 1896. "Grosse Polltlk'XI, 69.

13
dangerous rather than splendid. Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of
State for Colonies and more of a firebrand th n the calm and cauti-
ous Salisbury, struck the first warning note on January 21, 1896
when he said, "A few weeks ago England appeared t> stand alone in
the world, surrounded by jealous competitors and by altogether
unexpected hostility. Differences between ourselves and other
nations, which were of long standing, appeared suddenly to come to
15
a head and assume threatening proportions."
Anti-German feeling ran so high in England that more con-
servative officials in Germany became alarmed at the Kaiser's im-
petuosity and attempted to smooth matters over. In March, Italy
had suffered her c rushing defeat at Adowa in Abyssinia. French
support of Menellk and also Russian interest alarmed Italy and Aus-
tria, all the more as England had refused to renew the Meditteran-
ean Pact of 1387. English support for the Triple Alliance was
strongly needed, so Germany attempted t o show England that her own
near Eastern interests were in danger and persuade her of the deslre-
16
ability of Joining them. Salisbury, knowing of the previously
attempted European bloc following the Raid, answered courteously
but coldly.
The following year, 1897, the Diamond Jubilee in London
may have restored British pride and self-esteem in her consciousness
of leading the world in sea power, trade, and empire; but it also
may have added to the growing feeling that outside of the Empire,
she had no friends. Joint participation of France and Russia with
15-Egerton, H. E. "British Foreign Policy." p. 351-2
16. Brandenburg, Erich op.cit.p.90, Marschall's description of
conversation of Kaiser with Ambassador Lascelles. Marschall's
Despatch to Hotzfeldt March 4, 1896 "Grosse Politlk" XI, 235-6
•
14
Germany in the opening of the Kiel Canal 1895, as w ell as their
mutual cooperation in the Far East made English isolation even
more pronounced. Overtures were made to Russia in January and
March 1898, but this approach was terminated by Russia seizing
17
Port Arthur.
Then England paused and looked about. Where could she
turn for firends? Russia was her dreaded rival in Manchuria and
Persia. Germany was suspected of supDorting the Boer uprising in
Id
South Africa, there was friction over Samoa and Canada, she was
a keen c ommercial competitor beginning to undermine English mar-
kets in various parts of the world, and she had Just (March 28)
passed a bill for a large increase of her navy. Turkey was be-
coming more and more under German economic and military control
and besides, Egypt was still an open sore between Turkey and Eng-
land. French interests were clashing with British In Indo-China,
Madagascar, Newfoundland, Morocco, and even then the Marchand ex-
pedition was on its way, with definite d estination unknown, to
claim part of the Egyptian Sudan. Even the Unit ed States was es-
tranged over Samoa and the Venezuela boundary question.
Surely Chamberlain had c -.ure to say on May 13, 1898—
Since the Crimean War nearly fifty years ago, the policy of this
country has been a policy of strict isolation. We have had no
allies--I am afraid we have had no friends. A new situation has
arisen. All the powerful states of Europe have made alliances
17. Gooch and Temperley "British Documents on the Origins of the
War." Vol. I Ch.I, also Ward and Gooch op. cit. p. 257, and
Johnson and Bickford. "Contemplated German Alliance at Turn
of the Century" p. 31 auot es Tsar's letter to Kaiser from "Die
Grosse Politlk" XIV 3803.
18. See page $Q 1

15
and we are liable to be confronted at any moment w ith|a combination
of Great Powers so powerful that not even the most extreme politi-
cian would be able to contemplate it without a certain sense of
19
uneasiness. We stand alone
1
M The Boer War and its storm of crit-
icism confirmed this.
In the meantime, certain influential officials had come
to the conclusion that the difficulties with Germany were not as
insurmountable as the combined ones of France and Russia, so nego-
tiations were opened and Germany, who for years past had been ang-
ling for an alliance, now found herself sought by England. Salis-
bury was absent because of poor health and the affairs were largely
in Chamberlain's hands. All cards were laid on the table and Cham-
berlain stated frankly that If an alliance were not completed with
20
Germany, then one with France and Russia was not impossible. The
reasons for its rejection by Germany will be discussed fully in a
21
later chapter.
A friendly agreement was concluded, however, concerning
the proposed loan to Portugal and the possible division of her col-
onies. This secret convention was signed in August 1898, but never
became operative and the following year England secretly renewed
her old treaty of protection with Portugal in the Windsor Treaty
October 14, 1899.
Immediately after the Anglo-German Portuguese agreement
22
In 1898, there occurred the Fashoda incident . From this period
on to 1904, British diplomacy must be Interpreted in Its changing;
19- Fullerton, W. M. "Problems of Power" p. 65
2(D. Brandenburg, Erich op.cit. p.160
21. Chap. II part 5--Attempts toward Anglo-German agreement.
22. See page 22-

16
relations to Germany and France. There were more attempts at
Anglo-German rapprochement and more Anglo-French friction, but in
general, events were moving slowly but steadily toward the forma-
tion of the Entente of 1904. What was the main cause of this trend
of events? I think we may look for it in the rise t o power of Ger-
many with its attendant fears aroused in both England and France.

17
3. QTTTT.TNE OF FRENCH POLICY — HOME AND FOREIGN
The disastrous close of the war of 1870 had shattered the
French political hegemony on the Continent which she had enjoyed
practically since the days of Richelieu. It precipitated besides,
an internal crisis in the efforts to establish and secure the gov-
ernment under the Third Republic. It became necessary to defend the
country against enemies w lthin and without and regain some of the
lost prestige.
In 1875 France gained strength through two important
measures. February 25 saw the final passage of the Constitutional
Laws establishing the Republic and on March 28 measures were passed
which Increased the army by adaing a fourth battalion to every reg-
iment. This apparently warlike measure, coupled with the rapidity
the French war indemnity had been paid, aroused t he fear in high
German military circles that France hadjonly been half crushed and
was already preparing for a war of revenge.
There followed what is known as the War Scare of 1875*
On May 6 there appeared in the Times a sensational article by M.
deBlowitz, a Continental c orrespondent
,
giving a summary of what
had recently appeared in the German press and predicting that war
was on the point of breaking out. Immediate tension followed in
spite of Bismarck's published statement of denial in the North
German gazette: "The language of the European press is all the
more unintelligible as absolutely nothing has occurred which is
of a nature to trouble the relations existing between the French

18
1
and German Governments."
However, England, being aroused probably Itajpugh fear of
Belgium being threatened, thought it best to protest and did so,
by means of a letter from Queen Victoria to the Emperor. A personal
visit from the Tsar and his Minister, Gortchakoff, brought Russian
Influence t o bear, also. If Bismarck had any r eal intentions of
2
forcing an issue the project was abandoned.
To keep France Isolated and prevent her regaining Alsace
and Lorraine as well as her prestige, Bismarck fortified himself by
alliances with Austria, Russia, Italy, and Rumania. He kept Eng-
land friendly and he encouraged French oolonlal expansion as an
antidote for the lost provinces.
So France devoted her energies under Jules Ferry toward
building up a larger colonial empire. Except for the loss of Egy-
ptian interests in 1832, the period 1880-85 was one of expansion.
A protectorate was declared over Tunis in 1881, a Senegal and Niger
expedition was undert ken in 1883, gains were made in the Congo in
1834, and the French established themselves also in Madagascar and
in Tongking.
Ferry's policy had entailed enormous expense, it alienated
Italy over Tunis and helped to cause her entrance into the Triple
Alliance, it aroused friction with England over each acquiaition,
but it gave France a favorable position as a colonial power dTurlng
the Important colonial agreements made In the next decade.
1. Tardleu, Andre . "France and the Alliances" p. 125*
2. Schmitt, B. E. "England and Germany" p. 131 believes the war
scare may have been that Bismarck wanted to relieve the internal
pressure of the Kulturkampf b y a vigorous foreign policy.
*
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However, it created strong political opposition at home
and on Ferry's fall from power in 1885, coupled with reverses in
Indo-China, much of the colonial enthusiasm waned for a time and
thoughts were again turned toward France's position on the Conti-
nent. There she seemed isolated indeed. The Triple Alliance 1882
had been followed by an Insurance treaty between Russia and Germany
1384. In 1887 the Triple Alliance was renewed as well as the Re-
insurance treaty and England joined Austria and Italy in the Med-
iterranean Pact.
Just at this period there occurred a crisis in what
3
proved t o be internal as well as external affairs. In 1886 Erey-
cinet chose as Minister of War, General Boulanger who had seen ser-
vice in Algeria, Italy, and Cochin-Chlna in 1870, had been Director
of Infantry at the War Office in 1882, and in 1884 had commanded
the army in Tunis. Boulanger proved to be a firebrand. He immediate-
ly set out to restore French prestige, and revived the old desire
for the "revanche." He inaugurated ajs eriesjof reforms in the organ-
ization and munitioning of the army, erected new barracks, and in-
creased the troops on the eastern frontier. Immediately the Germans
felt their superiority challenged and In November 1886 and March 1887
army bills calling for an increase were passed.
Then while suspicions were rife, an incident happened on
the border which brought public opinion on both sides to fever heat.
On April 20 a French police commissary named Schnaebele was arrested
by the Germany after having croased the border on the strength of an
3. Lavisse, E. "Histoire de France Contemporalne2" Vol. 8 by M.J.C
Selgnobos, p. 117-143
*
20
invitation to confer with a German colleague concerning an adminis-
trative matter. The question was of little real importance for he
was soon released, but General Boulanger took this opportunity to
bring in a bill to mobolize an army corps and this provoked counter
manifestations in Germany in another army increase and harsher
measures in Alsace and Lorraine, practically closing those provinces
to French citizens.
The two Governments managed to keep cool and the crisis
passed, but there was another side to the Boulanger affair. He had
become the Idol of a large part of the French people. A Belgian
Charge analyzed his appeal thus, "In Boulanger, the whole of France
personifies her dreams of future greatness." The Clerical, Monar-
chist, and Bonapartlst parties saw a chance of overturning the Rep-
ublic through Boulanger' s leadership. For a time the opposition be-
came alarmingly serious, but at the psychological moment Boulanger
failed to take advantage of the chance for aicoup d'etat and the
movement collapsed.
Approaches were being made at thisltime by Bismarck to England
5
for an alliance against France and possibly Russia, so France be-
gan to feel stronger than ever the need of any ally for herself.
The other nation in a similar situation was Russia. In 1888 the
terms of the Austro-German pact of 1879 (directed against Russia)
had been published, and in 1890 Germany had allowed the Russo-Ger-
6
man Reinsurance treaty to lapse. Besides, Russia and Germany
were engaged in a tariff war and Germany had closed her banks to
Russian loans. German support of Austria, Roumanla, and Turkey
4. Gooch, G. P. "History of Modern Europe", p. 134
5« See page 10
6 . See page
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blocked Russian designs in the Balkans and Near East, so she was
ready to draw closer to France despite tne difference in tempera-
ments and governments. Mutual enmity to England was an equal if
not a greater factor.
Their approchement had begun in 1888 when Russian capital-
ists needing money for their growing industrial enterprises and
particularly for the Government project of a Trans-Siberian rail-
road, negotiated a loan with the French Government. Government
bonds were placed on the market and the French people, taking them
up, became creditors of th Russian Government. This form of pop-
ular finance gave millions of French citizens an economic Interest
in the stability of the existing Republican government and helped
strengthen it by discouraging revolution. Further loans were made
in the next decade.
In 1889 Russia placed an order for the manufacture of
500,000 rifles in France on assurance that they ? ould never be
used against the French. The fall of Bismarck in 1890 facilitated
matters when his policy of isolating France and holding Russia
friendly was no longer potent. Also, the renewal of the Triple
Alliance in 1891 was a further signal and the visit of the French
fleet at Cronstadt July 5 paved the way for a treaty of alliance
which was signed August 22. The following year a military conven-
tion was drawn up, but not ratified until 1894, due to the death
of Tsar Alexander III and a necessary readjustment following the
accession of Nicholas II. in 1893 the Russian fleet had been
feted at Toulon and in January 1895 a formal acknowledgment was
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made of the alliance. This was followed by more evidences of good
feeling in the Tsar's visit to Paris 1896 and President Faure's
return visit in 1897 • France was no longer isolated, both France
and Russia had a rear guard for their German frontiers, and Europe
was divided into a balance of power again between the Triple and
Dual Alliances.
To return to colonial matters, in 1890 France and England
had concluded an agreement over Zanzibar and Madagascar, but the
French return to a high protective tariff in 1892 caused more fric-
tion. In 1894- France and Germany Joined in a protest over the
Anglo-Cpngolese treaty. Friction in Siam was partially adjusted
between England and France|on January 15, 1896 and the Niger quest-
ion on June 15, 1098
.
The most serious rivalry was that of the Sudan. British
and Egyptians had abandoned their efforts to subjugate it after the
disaster of Khartoum in 1885* Renewed interest came as a result of
the Cape-to-Cairo project as against the French Cape-Verde-to-
Somaliland hopes. Also the dervishes were again becoming restless
and Britain felt that the time had come to assert her authority.
In 1895 Sir Edward Grey, Under Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, stated In the House of Commons in answer to a question
that the British Government would regard any attempt by another
power to occupy any part of the Upper Nile valley as an unfriendly
act. in 1896, Kitchener at the head of the reorganized Egyptian
army began the reconquest.
Despite the Grey declaration, Hanotaux considered the
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Sudan as being under the sovereignty of the Sultan and all nations
had equal rights there, so Marchand had been despatched from the
French Congo to establish a post on the Upper Nile, reaching Fasho-
da July 10, 1898. After the successful battle of Omdurman, Kitchen-
er learned of Marchand 's occupation, marched south to meet him on
September 19, and ordered him to retire. On Marchand 1 s refusal the
case was referred to the Home Governments and the tension became
acute in tooth countries.
France was seriously handicapped by the disorganized con-
dition of her army and officials as evidenced in the Dreyfus affair.
She was also doubtful of having Russian support so the new foreign
minister, Delcasse', accepted the British ultimatum and relinquished
rights to the Bahr-el-Ghazal region in return for territory east
and s outheast of Lake Tchad. From this there was born a strong
inclination to have a general clearing up of colonial matters be-
tween the two countries.
M» Hanotaux, Foreign Minister 1894-98, had championed
Ferry's ideas of colonial expansion in direct rivalry with England,
but Delcasse realized that colonial expansion was difficult if not
impossible without English consent and he sought to gain from her
friendship what he could not achieve through her enmity. It took
six years to accomplish this and other causesbf friction arose
during the process.
Throughout the period of colonial rivalry Just discussed,
there were important Continental policies. The formation of the
Dual Alliance required an adjustment in diplomacy. Germany, instead
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of accepting its challenge, attempted to act in concert with it
and thus nullify its effect as directed against herself. Russia
was kept on a friendly basis through the constant Interchange of
personal letters between the Kaiser and Tsar, and Germany also
refused t o entertain in the negotiations with England any policy
7
directed against Russia. To France on the death of its leaders,
ex-President MacMahon, President Carnot, and Jules Simon, the
Kaiser sent personal letters of sympathy • The three countries co-
operated in other instances , --at the opening of the Kiel Canal In
1895, and in a mutual protest at the Treaty of Shimoneseki, forcing
its revision in favor of China. Unsuccessful attempts were made
in 1896 by Germany to form a coalition against England in order to
save the independence of the South African Republics. These were
repeated by Russia In 1900 , but France refused to consider It be-
cause of the condition imposed by Germany requiring the territorial
status quo of the three countries to be observed, thus necessitating
the abandonment of hopes for regaining Alsace-Lorraine.
Between these two attempts occurred the Fashoda incident
Q
and the serious internal crisis of the Dreyfus affair. From an
army scandal, it developed into a fight for the very existence of
the Republic. The core of the ant 1-Drey fusard coalition, composed
of the mob element, the army, Catholics and Royalists, was anti-
Republican. Until the crisis was over the Government was practically
paralyzed, which accounts in part for the complete surrender in
the Fashoda situation.
7» See page 55.7
8. Lavlsse, E. op. cit. p. 193-98
t
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The outbreak of the Boer War intensified the anti-English
feeling in France, hut French official policy was now in the capabee
hands of Delcasse who had been connected w 1th the Colonial Office
from 1893-98 and Minister of Foreign Affairs 1898-1905.
Several personal visits to St. Petersburg 1899 and 1901,
helped to strengthen the bonds of the Dual Alliance which had been
wanting in Intensity as each country looked after her own affairs.
Russia had been turning her attention to questions in the Far East
while France was occupied at home with the Dreyfus affair, then a
religious struggle, and growing Interests in Morocco.
The main tenet of Delcasse' s policy aside from the recov-
ery of Alsace-Lorraine, seems to have been to safeguard France as
a Mediterranean power and his efforts from 1900 to 1904 were dir-
ected toward settlements with Italy, England, and Spain which would
secure this.
The economic troubles between France and Italy, as evid-
enced in the tariff war during the 'nineties, were settled by a
commercial treaty in 1898. A diplomatic understanding was arrived
9
at in 1900-02. The Franco-Moroccan accords of 1901 and 1902 had
given France a predominant interest in that country which was
confirmed by Italy in return for a free hand in Tripoli. Italy
also gave the assurance that she would consider the Triple Alliance
as a purely defensive matter and would not become either the ln-
10
strument or an auxiliary of aggressive measures against France.
Tentative approaches were made to Spain to settle the
9. See page 74
10. Lavisse, E- op. clt. p. 310
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Moroccan question, but these were not concluded until after t he
Anglo-French agreement of 1904.
4. GERMAN HEGEMONY IN EUROPE
If, as has been stated, the main cause of t he formation
of the Entente Cordiale was fear of Germany, then it will be neces-
sary to survey the German growth during this period in order to
prove or disprove the theory. Under t he masterly strategy of Bis-
marck, Germany reached the apogee of political domination on the
Continent. This was paralleled by an almost phenomenal industrial
and commercial expansion, both movements resulting in an outgrowth
of world policy championed by Emperor William II. A survey of these
factors will show the grounds for the English and French fears.
a. POLITICAL HEGEMONY
BISMARCK'S HOME AND FOREIGN POLICY AND TRIPLE vs. DUAL ALLIANCE
Unification of the German Empire and its elevation to a
place of primary Importance on the Continent had been attained
simultaneously. It was Bismarck's first care t o preserve what had
been accomplished Internally and defend the newly achieved political
importance
.
Isolation of France t o prevent a war of revenge prompted
the formation in 1372 of a friendly concert, or Drelkalserbund
,
among the rulers of Germany, Austria, and Russia to consult each
other in international affairs.
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German interests for the next four years were concerned
mainly at home with the religious trouble known as the Kulturkampf,
by which the Catholic party successfully opposed the state domina-
1
tion of the clergy. As noted before, the war scare of 1875 may have
been used partly as an outlet for distracting attention from this
movement
.
In 1876, due to the deadly rivalry of Austria and Russia
over ambitions in the Balkans, the Dreikaiserbund lapsed. Bismarck
as the "honest broker" of the Congress of Berlin in 1878 further
incurred Russian enmity and being forced to choose between the two,
Bismarck decided to ally himself more closely with Austria in the
Dual Alliance of October 1878. By this pact each nation promised
to assist the other in case of attack by Russia and t o adopt an
attitude of benevolent neutrality in case of attack by any other
power (meaning France), the terms of this treay remaining secret
until 1888.
Fortified by this alliance, Bismarck now saw the need of
securing a period of peace in which to develop the industrial and
commercial activities of his country. Extravagant speculation and
over production In the decade following the French war Indemnity had
brought on an economic crisis. The industrial leaders began an
agitation in opposition to free trade. They were backed by the
landowners in the agricultural districts who found it difficult to
compete with Russian, Argentine, and United States grain imported
free of duty. Added to this was the need of Increasing the Imperial
1. See page is
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revenue, eo in 1879 Bismarck championed a return to the protectionist
policy to foster home production.
Another internal measure was his state social legislation
from 1883-89 (accident, sickness, and old age insurance) to forestall
and suppress the rising Social-Democratic movement among the Radicals.
The Industrial expansion of the country led to the necessity
for securing colonies as sources of raw material as well as for mar-
kets and an outlet for overpopulation. Almost against his will Bis-
marck was forced t o sanction the colonial movement during the 'eight-
ies. He had felt that Germany's greatness depended on her Internal
strength and he was a royalist rather than an imperialist. He had
looked upon colonies more as apples of discord bo toss among his
2
rivals, as is evident from a reported conversation between him and
Lord Beaconsfield in 1878, "Do not quarrel with Russia, let her
take Constantinople while you take Egypt. France will not prove
inexorable. Besides, one might give her Syria or Tunis. 11
Before embarking on an extensive program of colonial ex-
pansion, Bismarck felt it necessary to further secure German primacy
on the Continent. He wrote, "The idea of coalitions gave me night-
4
mares," so his marvelous skill in diplomacy was exerted to prevent
their formation except in Germany's favor. His policy, which proved
successful as long as he was in control, was for France t o be kept
in isolation, England not antagonized, and Russia returned to a
fueling of friendliness.
2. Bullard, Arthur. "Diplomacy of the Great War", p. 17
3« Rose, J. H. "Origins of the War", p. 98 frpm Oppert, Correspond-
ent of the Times at Berlin.
4. Ibid. p. 9 quoted from Bismarck—"Reflections and Reminiscences."
Vol. II p. 250-3
%
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In 1882 the Dual Alliance Has expanded to include Italy
whose ancient grudge against Austria was not as strong as recent
5
ones against France. In 1383 Roumanla was added to the Triple
Alliance. True to his policy of retaining Russian friendship, Bis-
marck in 1884 attempted to renew the old entente of the three
Emperors. Tsar Alexander II had died in 1881 and Gortschakoff in
1883 and Bismarck hoped to find the new administration more sympa-
thetic. In 1884 was concluded a special agreement between Russia
and Germany known as the insurance t reaty . The union of Eastern
Roumella with Bulgaria 1886 led to differences between Russia and
the Central Powers and in 1837 the Tsar wished t o withdraw, but
Bismarck persuaded him to a Reinsurance b ond for three more years.
In the meanwhile England had cooperated with Austria and
Italy in the Mediterranean agreement of 1837 and following the
Franco-German war scare of 1887-8, had been approached by Germany
for an alliance subsequent to previous attempts of 1875 and 1879*
The accession of William II in 1888 and the consequent
friction ensuing between the new aggressive ruler and the old master
diplomat whose iron hand as Chancellor had virtually controlled all
matters for twenty years until his fall In 1890, led t o a trans-
formation in European politics. Bullard says, "Bismarck left to
his nation a tradition of statescraft which only g enlus could manage
His technique in the hands of lesser men has not worked so smoothly.
The new Chancellor, Caprlvl, was a military man and a
5« Napoleon breaking the treaty of 1859, French support of the
Pope, and the French protectorate over Tunis 1881.
6. Bullard, Arthur, op. clt. p. 22
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political novice and was conscious of lacking Bismarck's skill.
The question of the renewal of the Rus so -German treaty was upper-
most at t he time. Both Hammann and Brandenburg lay the responsi-
bility for its non-renewal to Baron von Holstein, "the greatest
7
Intellectual force among statesmen of the post-Bismarckian period,"
a silent, rather mysterious, but extremely potent factor behind
German diplomacy. Caprlvi and the new Secretary of State, Baron
von Marschall, influenced by Holstein, began to have doubts about
renewing the treaty. They feared that Russian influence in Bul-
garia might bring on a general war and besides, the treaty was
thought to be incompatible with the Austro-German and the Roumanian
treaties (which were considered more valuable.) Also, it was like-
ly to alienate England. In Hammann 1 s words, "The decisive factor
in deciding whether. there should be a new treaty or whether the
Russian proposals should be rejected was, therefore, the fear that
an acceptance of the clauses dealing with the Straits
,
[promising
control of them and Constantinople to Russia as compensation for her
neutrality in certain cases of war] if disclosed, contained enough
inflammatory material to irritate England and blow up the Triple
g
Alliance
However, the refusal to renew it was the signal, which,
added to other causes, led directly to the drawing together of
Russia and France into the Dual Alliance. Europe became divided
into two armed camps w ith England as spectator growing more and
more uneasy.
7« Brandenburg, Erich op. clt. p. 23
8. Hammann, Otto, op. clt. p. 48, also Flick, A. C "Modern
World History" p. 511
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In the Dual Alliance the electric current lacking before
between the two sources of unrest--Alsace-Lcrraine and the Bal-
kans, was now set up. The chief concern of the Kaiser, according
to Brandenburg, became to manipulate and nullify the effective-
ness of the Alliance by removing the inflammable material from
9
the two danger zones in Europe and piling it up in the Far East.
Thus, we have the cooperation in 1895 against the Shimoneseki
Treaty, joint intervention in the Boxer uprising of 1900, as well
as interest in the Boer War situation.
The rashness of the Kruger telegram episode had been
partially counteracted and until after 1900 the Kaiser had managed
to prevent his friendship with Russia and France from seriously
affecting the cordial relations with England. Hammann believes
that "the responsibility for Germany's lost opportunities for
rapprochement with England must be placed to the account of Bulow's
favorite theory that England always made other nations pull her
chestnuts out of the fire, and partly to Holstein's academic policy
and his dogma that the antagonism of England and Russia was an im-
mutable fact. He also considered it impossible that Morocco could
ever form a bridge for an entente cordiale between England and
10
France .
"
After 1900 the aggressive world policy of the German
triumverate, Emperor William II, Chancellor von Bulow, and the
Naval Secretary, Admiral v on Tlrpltz, became more evidently menacing
11
and after the unsuccessful attempts at rapprochement In 1598-1901,
9. Brandenburg, Erich op. cit. p. 59
10. Hammann, Otto, op. cit. p. 116
11. See page 56-c
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England awoke to the same fear that France had entertained since
1870.
b. GERMAN ECONOMIC EXPANSION
The economic expansion of a country has for its basis the
growth of population and its shift to urban life, development of
industries based on raw materials and using the new applied scien-
tific methods assisted by organized capital, the extension of for-
eign trade, and the building up of a large merchant marine. These
lead naturally to the desire for a strong navy, the acquisition of
colonies, economic penetration into other countries, and political
influence
.
England and France had already gone through practically
all of these steps. This was because they had achieved their uni-
fication centuries before and had g ained (England especially) by
an early start through the Industrial Revolution.
Germany began late, but she profited by the earlier mis-
takes of the others, took advantage of modern industrial methods
already in use, organized and applied them so efficiently that her
marvelous development first astonished, and then frightened those
countries which she rivalled and threatened to surpass.
GROWTH OF POPULATION
Since 1370, the number of births in Germany has been larger
in proportion to her population than any other European state ex-
cept Russia. Her death rate has decreased and since 1900 the emlgra-
1. Helfferich, Karl. "Germany's Economic Progress and National
Wealth." p. 17
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tion has fallen to such a negligible quantity that there is much
pressure from overpopulation. Comparative statistics of population
for Germany, England and France show approximately:
F1ATK fi-KRMANY ENGLAND FRANCE
1875 42,700,000 33,100,000 36,900,000
1905 60,600,000 43,200,000 39,200,000
An increase of 42 per cent in Germany as against 31 per
cent in England and 6 per cent in France
.
This situation was a serious question for France with a
population almost stationary. "The German increase during t wo months
3
equalled that of France for five years.' Need for more man power
was probably one of the factors leading to the formation of the Al-
liance with Russia as well a6 furthering the desire for more colon-
ies as possible sources of supply for auxiliary troops.
The large German population increase required t he enlarge-
ment of the food supply. More intensive cultivation of the soil
was practiced ith improved s cientific methods of drainage, fertili-
zers, and use of machinery, so substantial gains were made in the
yield of crops. However, Germany ceased to be self-subsistent after
1383 and in 1900 food Imports amounted to 29 per cent of the total
4
imports
.
SHIFT OF POPULATION TO URBAN LIFE
There was a gradual exodus from the country to the city
and the economic system changed from agricultural t o industrial and
2. Schmltt, B. E • op. cit. p. 73 Emigration 1880—200,000 a year1900— 20,000 a year
3. Schapiro, J. S. "Modern and Contemporary European History" p. 272
4. Schmltt, B. E. op. cit. p. 74
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commercial. In 1882 a census of the occupations of wage earners
and their ©.milies showed-^ 19.23 millions employed in agriculture
against 18.5 millions in 1895, while manufacturing r ose from 16.06
millions in 1882 to 20.25 in 1895, and trade and commerce 4.53 mil-
lions in 1882 to 5*97 millions engaged in that occupation in 1895.
In 1871 there were only 8 large towns of over 100,000
inhabitants, but by 1900 this had grown to 33* The ratio of urban
to rural population changed.^
1900
Town population (5,000 and over) 23*7 • 42.26
Rural communities (under 5,000) 76.3 *
•
57.74
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
To support the increasing urban population, new industries
must be created. Industrial development rests largely on coal and
iron resources. Germany has coal deposits in the Rhineland, West-
phalia, Silesia, and the Saar valley. The iron ore in Lorraine be-
came of great value after the process invented in 1878 made it pos-
sible to burn out the phosphorus and use even the slag for fertilizer
The physical sciences were developed and applied so that
labor saving machinery, steam, electricity, combustion motors, and
gas engines further a lded Industrial growth. Chemical processes
were used in producing fertilizers, artificial indigo, vanilla, coal
tar dyes, pharmaceutical preparations etc. These products were
5. Cambridge Modern History Vol.XII p. 169
6. Dawson, W. H. "Evolution of Modern Germany", p. 39
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produced much more cheaply because the processes demanded less
time, power, and raw materials and recovered for new uses the by-
products and waste
.
Germany soon challenged England as the "workshop of the
world" for her exports of machinery, textiles, leather goods, wood
work, chemicals, and pottery were of the same type as England's and
therefore rivalled her.
France exports largely elegant articles of art, luxury,
and fashion--sllks
,
wines, toilet articles, furnishings for parlor,
wardrobe, and boudoir and she imports the coarser fabrics, so her
needs are reciprocal rather t han antagonistic to England and Germany.
It was between England and Germany then, that this Indus
-
7
trial production was serious, as evidenced in the following tables.
COAL PRODUCTION
UNITED KINGDOM GERMANY
Tons Metric tons (2204 lbs.
1830 146,969,000 46 ,974,000
1890 181,614,000 70,233,000
1900 225.181,000 109,290,000
Increase 53. 9$ Increase 132.6%
IRON ORE
UNITED KINGDOM GERMANY
Tons Metric tons
1380 18,026,000 7.239.000
1890 13,781,000 11,406,000
1900 14,028,000 18,964,000
Decrease Increase 161,9%
7. Schmitt, B. E. op.cit. p. 100
t
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PIG IRON
UNITED KINGDOM GERMANY
T ons 1C XiCllB
1380 7,749,000 2,713,000
1890 7,904,000 4,651,000
1900 8,959,000 8,507,000
Increase 15*6% Increase 213 .6%
CRUDE STEEL
UNITED KINGDOM GERMANY
Tons Metric tons
1380
1390 3.579.000 2,232,000
1900 4,901.000 6,362,000
Increase 36.9% Increase l35$
England had led in iron production of the world until
1900 when the United States got first place, but in 1903 Germany
Q
gained the first rank.
The cotton industry was next to feel the rivalry. The
average annual number of spindles employed in Germany in 1870-74
rose from 4,262,000 to 8,450,000 in 1900-04 and the consumption
of raw cotton from 2.2 million cwt. to 6.8 for the same years.
Also, the estimated annual consumption of raw sheep and lamb's wool
9
averaged 174.5 million lbs. in 1875-9 and was 345. 3 in 1900-04.
A comparison of cotton Importation statistics of Liverpool and Bremen
show in bales
i
LIVERPOOL BREMEN
1885 2,553,793 530451
1395 2.090,123 913,955
1905 2,435,636 L612.dK
A decrease for Liverpool as against 222.7 pe# cent Increase
for Bremen.
8« Ogg, F. A. "Economic Development of Modern Europe," p. 227
9. Ashley, Percy "Modern Tariff History" p. 105-6
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Another example is the Indigo production. Indigo had been
one of India's great staples. At the beginning of the decade 1890-
1900 her total crop was estimated from #20,000,000 to $25,000,000
with both culture and trade almost exclusively in English hands.
Then Germany, by chemical processes, made artificial indigo from
coal tar products, producing three-fourths of all the indigo used
in the world, so in the early years of the twentieth century the
11
total yield of India had fallen to one-fourth its former amount.
The impetus to German industrial growth had come largely
through the unification of Germany making possible a comprehensive,
coordinated, national industrial policy. The receipt of the French
war indemnity had given capital for this expansion and the acquisi-
tion of Alsace and Lorraine with their resources and output, added
greatly to the development as did also the increase in population.
The systematic support of home industries by protective tariff after
1879 led to its use as a weapon or a bargain for securing better
12
concessions in foreign trade. Commercial treat ies w 1th foreign
countries opened new markets.
One secret of this successful expansion lay in the coordin-
ation of the various processes of production. The Krupps, for in-
stance, produce all that they require from ore to the finished pro-
duct. Their organization includes coal mines, coking plants, iron
mines, smelting works, steel working up to the manufacture of
machines, cannon, other munitions, and armor plate; also electrical
11. Schulze-Galvernitz
, Dr. G. von. "England and Germany --Peace or
War?" In American Review of Reviews (November 1909) p. 604-5.
12. Ogg, F. A. "Economic Development of Modern Europe", p. 224-5
€
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works, river vessels for transporting coal and ores, and a high sea
13
fleet.
Business undertakings are consolidated into Kartells in
which each firm retains its individuality, accepts certain rules
in regard t o production which eliminates wasteful c ompetition, and
shares in the effort to keep prices stable and remunerative and se-
cure the maximum of economic success.
The prequisite basis of capital for extensive technical
equipment and labor is concentrated through stock companies and the
credit system. An intimate c orrelation exists between the industrial
and banking systems. The large Berlin banks owned shares in provin-
cial banks and also blocks of shares in industrial companies and
14
have representatives on their governing boards.
Facilities of land and water transportation have been in-
creased. The railways are largely owned and operated by individual
states, but supervised by an Imperial Railway Board establishing uni-
form regulations for the entire Empire. Low rates are allowed on
export goods to enable the German manufacturer to better compete in
foreign markets. If new industries are begun, rates on raw mater-
15
ials imported are lowered in orderfto encourage the enterprise. To
show the comparative growth of railroads in the United Kingdom and
16
(jermany, we find that:
UNITED KINGDOM GERMANY
1870 15,239 miles 11,600 miles
1900 21,826 31, 173
Increase 43.2% Increase 168.7%
13. Helffrlch, Karl op.cit.p.42
14. Allen, G. H. "The Great War—Causes and Motives" Vol.1 p.73-4
15. Schaplro, J. S.-op.cit. p. 305
16. Hurd and Castle op.cit. p. 238
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Inland water transportation was made cheap and e asy by
the construction of 6,000 miles of natural and artificial waterways
and channels of shallow rivers were dredged out.
EXTENSION OF FOREIGN TRADE
The necessity of importing huge quantities of raw mater-
ials to make over into manufactured articles and the surplus exported
in return for food and more raw materials, led t» the need of expand-
ing the foreign trade. The Germans applied the same thorough scien-
tific methods in extending their trade and securing raw materials
and markets as they had in the industrial production. They realized
that the commercial field was already full of earlier competitors
whom they must rival and undermine. German business methods which
challenged the English trade were built up on an efficient system
of cheap goods, effective advert ising, competent well-trained sales-
men, catering to individual and national tastes, and government
17
assistance
.
Cheap goods were made possible by the plentiful supply of
labor whose living standard was lower and more economical than the
English, as well as by the mechanical labor saving devices and the
scientific processes by which the goods were produced.
The English had followed the traditional customs, had
offered standard wares in standard forms, and had demanded quick
payments through English banking houses. The Germans, after study-
ing the markets, offered wares made especially to suit the taste or
17. Schmitt, 5 . E. op.cit. p. 100
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needs of the customers, gave long credits, and allowed e asy payments.
Their wares were just as serviceable, less expensive, and gave more
complete satisfaction in many Instances. The English acknowledged
the superiority of German methods. The English Consul at Rio de
Janeiro said, "The Germans have conquered South America by the pecu-
liar study they have made of its requirements," and the Consul at
18
Riga, MA German seizes every opportunity of pleasing his customers'.'
This success in salesmanship was based mainly upon the
thorough training given the commercial representatives t hrough the
technical schools and mercantile colleges. Not only industries and
trades were taught, but foreign languages, characteristics and meth-
ods, so the commercial houses could secure a trained corps of excel-
lent technically trained salesmen with a knowledge of the customs
and needs of the foreign market.
Ambassadors and Consuls acted as commercial agents also,
keeping the home industries informed as io conditions and needs of
the various markets. Government assistance, both of the various
states and the Imperial Government, was given to the training schools,
protective legislation was passed, while the state controlled and
regulated charges on inland transportation. Manufacturing Interests
were furthered by Industrial Associations and Chambers of Commerce,
and foreign trade was promoted by an Association of Export Firms of
the large industrial towns who had agents abroad t o keep them posted
19
on arrangements for transport of goods, tariffs etc.
As early as 1835 the English had begun to feel the e ffects
18. Tardieu, Andre op. cit. p. 54
19. Dawson, W. H. op. clt. p. 94
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of the Industrial rivalry. Being a free trade country , she received
free of duty almost all exports of r ival countries while compelled
to pay on goods sent to those countries duties ranging from 10 per
20
cent to as high as 130 per cent. From August 1885 to December 1886
a "Royal British Commission on the Depression of Trade and Industry"
met and collected an immense number of consular reports and statis-
tics and suggested that British business interests were making in-
effective opposition to German competition. Another Parliamentary
21
commission reached the same conclusion in 1896. In 1887 a law
was passed by Parliament requiring all goods not manufactured in
England to be so marked, but the label, "Made in Germany" has had
the effect of widely advertising German goods.
An English commercial attache in a study of English trade
from 1885-95 wrote, "Our industrial supremacy is no longer the proven
fact it used to be. We no longer 3re in the enviable situation of
former times when we never met in the markets of the world any seri-
ous competitors in the sale of our manufactured products. The good
old times are over; the evolution and progress of all nations has
22
forces us to face new conditions." Again, in 1902 an official
document devoted to a comparative study of the economic development
of Great Britain and her principal c ompetitors concluded with, "if
peace is not disturbed, Germany and the United States w.ill certainly
continue their industrial and commercial development. The competi-
tlon which these countries are offering us In the neutral markets
20. Ogg, F. A. "Economic Development of Modern Europe" p. 272
21. Schmltt, B. E. op. cit. p. 98
22. Viallate, Achille. op. cit. p. 49 quotes W. S. H. Gastrell,
"Our Trade in the World in Relation to Foreign Competition
1385-95" p.
2
(0
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and even in our home market, unless we prove active, will become
23
more and more serious."
One of the real causes of the inferiority of English in-
dustry should be sought in England itself, the lack of widespread
scientific education systematically organized being the real reason
24
for slowness of economic advance. Asqulth analyzed it thus, "A
defective knowledge, the use of inferior methods, lack of flexibility
and versatility, an obstinate Industrial conservation, these are the
true enemies of English Industry, they harm it infinitely more than
all the customs, tariffs and all the dumping syndicates that were
ever created."
English trade was not really so decadent, but only by con-
trast w 1th the sudden rapid development of Germany, it seemed to be
26
progressing slowly.
Merchandise for which returns have been received , --exclusive
27
of bullion and specie.
IMPORTS FOR TWELVE MONTHS ENDING DECEMBER 1900, POUNDS STERLING
Germany United Kingdom France
277,853,000 523,075,000 187,912,000
(For twelve months ending December 1903)
299,176,000 473,349,000 185,956,000
EXPORTS --SAME YEARS
220,717,000 *291, 192,000 164,348,000
248,979,000 *290,890,000 166,794,000
* Exports of British and Irish produce and manufactore. The table
shows a German increase w hlle the British decreased.
23. Ibid, p. 49 quotes Memorandum by A • E. Bateman (1902) "Compara-
tive Statistics of Population, Industry and Commerce."
24. Ibid p. 51
25* Asquith, H. H. "Trade and the Empire" p. 31 Speech at Cinder-
ford October 8, 1903*
26. Whelpley, J. D . "The Trade of the World" p. 63
27. Great Britain, Board of Trade. "Foreign Trade and Commerce."
Reports 1901 and 1904
•
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Holt and Chilton gives the total Imports and exports for
28
Great Britain as:
1875 -- #3,250,000,000 49 per cent increase
1905 4,850,000,000
And for Germany
1875 -- #1,500,000,000
1905 -- 3,300,000,000 — 120 per cent increase
We know also that from 1870 to 1900 Germany rose from fourth
to second place in international trade. ^9
30
Durham points out however, that only in Europe has Brit-
ain cause for fear of German competition. In 1899-1903 Germany sold
to European countries L 65,434,000 more per annum than Britain and
in 1904-08 she s old them L 92,012,000 more. This is largely due to
her position in Central Europe. The important markets are at her
door and she can get goods into them generally at the cost of one
handling and one train journey at very cheap rates.
IN THOUSAND POUNDS STERLING
TO FROM GERMANY FROM ENGLAND
1899-1903 1904-1908 Increase 1899-1903 1904-1908 Increase
ffoungrfes 175.284 224.280 50.990 107,850 132.268 24.418
?on-European
orelgn count-
fii^5kfeS lud ' 43.055 64.921 21.866 75.278 111.068 35.790
British pos-
kong g RPns
"
9,259 11.476 2.217 98,859 113,513 19.654
TOTAL 225,598 300,677 75,079 2Bl,987 361,849 79,862
28. Holt ana Chilton "History of Europe 1862-1914" p. 297
29. Bullard, Arthur op.cit. p. 56
30. Durham, Geoffrey "Foreign Trade of Great Britain and Germany"
in Contemporary Review (October 1910) p. 398-402
#
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As regards European trade, Germanu made better progress
than England, but England surpassed in non-European foreign countries
where competitors were on more even terms as far as transportation
is concerned and also progressed more in the British possessions.
GROWTH OF THE MERCHANT MARINE
Foreign trade is dependent upon an adequate mercantile
marine and the growth of the shipping industry in Germany kept pace
with the needs, in 1871 Germany had approximately 147 steamships
with a net tonnage of 81,994 and 4,372 sailboats net tonnage
900,361, totalling 4,519 ships with 982,355 tonnage. This was in-
creased by 1904 to 1,622 steamships with 1,739,690 tonnage and 2,253
31
sailboats of 497,607 totalling 3,382 ships of 2,237,297 net tonnage
which means 127.7 per cent increase.
The German share in the merchant marine of the world in
32
1874 was 5.2 per cent, in 1894—6.5 and in 1905--9.9 while the
Hamburg-American and the North German Lloyd lines were the two
largest shipping concerns in the world; but comparison with statis-
tics of the United Kingdom show the total net register of tonnage
to be
:
UNITED KINGDOM GERMANY
1870 5,690,739 932.355
1530 6.574,513 1.181.525
1390 7.978.533 1.433.413
1900 9.304,103 1.941.645
The British strengthened their general lead by 2,654,029,
so the challenge was not as large as to cause immediate fear, greatest
31. Dawson, W. H. op. cit. p. 70
32. Dawson, W. H' loc. cit.
33* Hurd and Castle op. cit. p. 305
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competition coming after 1904.
NAVAL EXPANSION
The growing merchant marine however, required also the
growth of a navy to support and protect it and in this factor we
find the main root of English suspicion. The Germans admit this.
Hammann says, "The increasing rivalry of England and Germany in
mercantile policies and international commerce did not of itself
need to lead to political discord had Germany not adopted an exten-
34
sive naval policy."
In 1889 the British Naval Defense Act had laid down the
two-power standard directed against France and Russia. The inaug-
uration of a new German naval policy as expressed by the Kaiser,
35
"Our future lies on the water" brought Germany within the sphere
of active rivalry.
Admiral Mahan in his summary of the position of England
in 1713 had said, "The sea power of England was not merely in a
great navy Neither was it in a prosperous commerce It was
in the union of the two carefully fostered that England made the
gain of sea power over and beyond all other states." The Germans
had taken this as an example and under the active instigation of
the Kaiser and the able organization of Admiral von Tlrpitz,
Marine Minister since 1897, an ambitious naval bill was passed March
28,1898 providing for seventeen battleships, eight coast defense
34. Hmtnn, Otto op. clt. r-2^C
3b • Gooch, G. P. "History of Modern Europe" p. 231
36. Robinson, Howard. "The Development of the British Empire"
p. 83 quotes A. T. Hahan "The Influence of Sea Power Upon
History 1660-1733" p. 225 .
•0
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vessels, nine large and twenty-six small cruisers. This program was
doubled June 12, 1900 and what gave it especial interest was the
explanatory memorandum annexed to the law. This definitely announced
German intentions to become a mighty naval power. "To protect 'Ger-
many's sea trade and colonies in the existing circumstances there is
only one means: Germany must have a battle fleet so strong that
even for the adversary with the greatest sea power, a war against
it would involve such dangers as to imperil his position in the
37
world ."
A Navy League was organized in 1898 to win popular support
for the new German sea aspirations. It has been said that the League
was financed by the Krupp family and other manufacturers who would
38
benefit by an Increase of the fleet. The League grew from 286
local branches with a contributing membership of 250,000 in 1900 to
393,600 branches and 635,00 members In 1904. There were numerous
methods of spreading propaganda—monthly papers, pamphlets, items of
naval news sent about once a week to papers, a Naval album published,
lectures and illustrated lantern slides, uniforms, badges and bunt-
ing supplied for local festivities. The most effective department
was that which arranged excursions to Naval ports for school classes
40
from Inland districts to arouse enthusiasm. "The increase of the
fleet may have been defensive in theory and intention, but it was
41
aggressive in its effect."
The British feeling concerning this challenge to her sea
power Is well expressed by Sir Edward Grey; "There is no comparison
37 . Hurd and Castle op. clt. Appendix II
33. Ibid. p. 209
39. Holt and Chilton op. clt. p. 301
40. Hurd and Castle op. clt. p. 210
41. Ibid p. 285
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oomparloon between the importance of the German navy to Germany and
the importance of our navy to us. Our navy is to us what their army
is to them. To have a strong navy would increase their prestige,
their diplomatic influence, their power of protecting their commerce,
42
but it is not the matter of life and death to them that it is to us."
ACQUISITION OF COLONIES
The colonial question had not interested Germany until about
1880. Then the need of colonies became urgent as a means of securing
necessary raw materials as well as outlets for surplus production,
capital, and population. There were political reasons as well,—to
enhance German prestige and power by participation in the general Im-
perialistic movement.
The most valuable colonies had already been acquired by the
other nations, but Germany secured West and East Africa, the Cameroons,
Togoland, and islands in the pacific. German hopes of uniting West
and East Africa led in a large measure to the support of the Boers.
The Kaiser wanted to declare a Transvaal Protectorate and despatch
troops immediately afterjt he Jameson raid, but his Ministers talked
him out of it because of its danger and suggested a telegram of con-
43
gratulation instead. Hammann says that Germany wanted to safeguard
her economic intereetsjin South Africa and could not take the Initia-
tive in declaring a protectorate unless South Africa made proposals
to the European powers to obtain guarante es against similar attacks.
42. Schmltt, 3. E. op. cit. p. 201
43« Brandenburg, Erich op. cit. p. 84-5*
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Then the German Government could support them, so the telegram was
meant to assure them of German interest in case the proposals shhuld
44
be forthcoming.
ECONOMIC PENETRATION
German colonies were small in area and poor in quality as
compared with those of the other nations, so commercial penetration
became of more value than acquiring actual colonies. Brazil, being
shut out from political acquisition by the Monroe Doctrine, fell to
a large extent under German economic control. Morocco also, since
the Convention of Madrid 1880 had been the scene of active commercial
interest. In China a fortified naval base was secured by the lease
of Kiail-Chau on March 6, 1899 and with it, the commercial control of
the adjacent territory, thus making the greater part of the province
of Shantung into a German sphere of influence.
The scene of greatest activity was in the Ottoman Empire.
As early as 1880 a commercial society was founded in Berlin with a
45
capital of 50,000,000 marks to promote the penetration of Asia Minor.
In 1883 General von der Goltz was sent at the request of the Sultan
to reorganize the Turkish army. A branch of the Deutsche Bank of
Berlin had been established in Constantinople and in 1890 a Turko-
German commercial treaty was made. In 1889 and again in 1898 the
Kaiser visited Constantinople, on the latter visit extending the
Journey to the Holy Land where at a memorable speech at Damascus
44. Hammann, Otto, op. cit. p. 69-71
45. Marriott, J. A. R. "The Eastern Question", p.404
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November 8, 1898, he named himself protector of all the Sultan's
Mohammedan subjects through out the East.
J. E. Barker says, "The Germans were attracted •'oward
Asiatic Turkey not only because of its vast economic possibilities,
but also because of itsjmatchless position at a spot where three
continents meet, where three continents may be dominated, where
Russia and the British Empire may most effectively be attacked, where
46
the rule of the world may be won." Communication between Europe and
Asia was carried on mostly by the two water routes , --around South
Africa and the shorter one through the Mediterranean Sea and Suez
Canal, both controlled by England. A quicker and easier one would
be by railroad. One that extended from Berlin through central Europe
and the Balkans to Constantinople and from there across Asia Minor
to the Persian Gulf would hold a strategic menace to the British Em-
pire, while it would also open up a country of unrivalled and so far,
undeveloped resources. Von Bulow speaks of it, "This land can hardly
be surpassed for fertility and for its great possibilities of devel-
opment in the future. If one can speak of boundless prospects any-
47
where, it is in Mesopotamia." So the project known as the Bagdad
Railway was laundhed
.
In 1888 Turkey gave a concession to financial Interests
headed by the Deutche Bank to purchase the line already built from
Haidar Pasha (opposite Constantinople) to Ismld and continue it to
Anglora. The Anatolian Railway Co. was formed in 1889 to work the
46. Barker, J. E. "Great Problems of British Statesmanship," p. 60
47* Viallate, Achille op. cit. p.46 quotes Prince B, von Bulow in
"imperial Germany", English translation 1914, p. 98.
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concession. Angora was reached In 1892 and a new concession ex-
tended the line to Konla, which was completed in 1896. The right
to build to Bagdad and Basra was secured by a convention in 1899 and
in 1903 a concession was granted by the Sultan for ninety-nine years
to a new corporation, the Bagdad Railway Co. (in which the Anatol-
ian Co. took shares) authorizing the extension of the line includ-
ing branch lines to a terminus at a point on the Persian Gulf.
In 1900 the Germans had endeavored to buy a concession
from the Sheik of Koweit for a Persian Gulf port, but he refused,
backed by British support. He had secretly accepted protection
from the British Government against the Sultan in 1899 for a pro-
mise not to cede any territory without British consent. Russia had
also been unwilling to allow the railroad to pass so near her Cau-
casus frontier and had forced the Germans to plan a more southern
route. In 1900 a branch line had been begun by the Sultan, with
German support, from Damascus south to Medina and Mecca, menacing
the English control of Egypt as the main line menaced India.
The new concession of March 5, 1903 Included mining rights,
harbor facilities and privileges of inland navigation as well as a
large kilometrlc guarantee. The railway was not likely to be self-
supporting and this guarantee would necessitate an inc__rease of the
Turkish customs and a reorganization with German backing. This
would fall heavily on the British imports which e xceeded those of
other countries.
The Germans needed financial support in the construction
of the line and the British at first thought it better to participate
•
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than to have it built without their control. The German financial
project proposed that she, England, and France each raise an equal
amount and the remainderjg o to small neutral countries. However,
England feared that neutral interests would be sold out to Russia.
Also, the bonds were t o be Turkish Government securities which were
sure to depreciate in value and give the Deutsche Bank an opportunity
to buy them in at a low rate and acquire practical ownership.
It had been represented to England at first that the rail-
road would be under international control. Besides d oubts as to the
sound financial methods, she found that it would be entirely in the
hands of a company under German control through appointing a major-
ity of the directors, when the Convention between the Turkish Govern-
ment and the Ana.olian Railway Co. was published, so the British group
withdrew
.
A French group in the Ottoman Bank had reached an agreement
with the Deutsche Bank in 1899 through the interests of M. Rouvier.
After the British withdrawal, the new arrangement suggested to France
was 40$ German, k0% French and 20% neutral consisting of 10% Austrian,
b% S~iss, 2% for Milanese bankers and the remaining 3$ for bankers in
Constantinople, all more or less under German influence. With the
English and Russian hostility to the project added to his own sus-
picions, Delcasse withdrew his Government's support. Some French
capital did enter, but contrary to the expressed wishes of the Gov-
ernment. Thus the Bagdad Railway enterprise placed France and Eng-
48
land on co mmon ground in their distrust of Germany.
43. Material for the Bagdad project found principally in Gooch and
Temperley. op. cSt. ch. 12; Hammann, Otto, op. cit. p. 240-44;
Fraser, David. "The Short Cut to India", ch. 3, 22, 24, 25; Schmitt
B. E. op. cit. ch.10; Stuart, G. H. '.'French Foreign Policy",
p. 102-07; Cheradame, ifldre"The Bagdad Railway"; Ward and Gooch
op. cit. p. 299-301
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In concluding the discussion of the general eeonomic riv-
alry between Germany and England, a German himself acknowledges
that, "Our rise depended essentially on the English policy of the
open door. We were sojourners in England's house, paying guests of
the Anglo-Saxons. The secret of our success, apart from our organ-
ization and the training of our working classes, lies in the fact
that England and the countries which a re the great producers of raw
materials, granted us an open door and allowed us to draw on their
49
vast reservoirs of raw materials." Realizing the truth of this,
a movement in England known as the tariff reform had been initiated
to substitute for free trade a system of preferential trade between
the colonie s and mother country, --a sort of "Imperial Zollvereln"
or customs union with a protective tariff against foreign goods.
This was not accomplished before 1904, but the agitation has con-
tinued .
c. GERMAN "WELTPOLITIK"
Commercial rivalry was not alone the cause of suspicion
and fear against Germany. Her sudden accession of wealth and power
inspired great self-confidence which demanded recognition. Their
national achievements Impressed the conviction upon the Germans that
they possessed superiority in civilization and were therefore called
to a place of leadership among the nations.
In this desire for world prestige the imperial idea seems
to have been inherited from the old Holy Roman Empire. In 1900 the
Kaiser said, "I hope that to Germany it will be granted to become in
the future as closely united, as powerful, and as authoritative as
49- Egerton, H. E. "British Colonial Policy in the 20th Century"
p. 117-18 quotes Emil Zimmerman—"The German Empire of Central
Africa", English translation with Introduction by Edwyn Bevan,
p. 2.
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1
was once the Roman Empire." Nowhere is the passion for world power
so clearly shown as in a further utterance of the Kaiser on July 3,
1900, "The wave-heat knocks powerfully at our gates and calls us as
a great nation to maintain our place in the world— in other words
to purs«eworld policy. The ocean is indispensable for German great-
ness; but the ocean also reminds us that neither on it nor across
it in the distance can any great decision be again arrived at with-
2
out Germany and t he German Emperor."
This doctrine dominated the governing classes and the idea
of superiority was impressed on the masses of the German people
through education and literature. The most influential possibly of
the interpreters of this extreme national ardor was the man known
as the "Bismarck of the Chair" --Henrich von Treitschke who was
Professor of History, first st Heldelburg and then at the University
of Berlin. "In the hands of this Prussian historian who combined
great learning with fervent patriotism, History became a form of
3
political propaganda." He taught that the state was all powerful
and it was the duty of Germany to expand her power by force of arms.
He implanted the idea also that England was the greatest enemy who
must be conquered before Germany could fulfil her mission of spread-
ing German Kultur throughout the world.
The philosophy underlying this ideal of weltpolitik as
well as its outward manifestations may be seen in Treitschke 's pro-
phecy
:
!• Ogg, P. A. "Herman Ambition for World Power", p. 33
2. Dawson, TVm. H« op. cit. p«3^9
3^ Schapiro, J. S. op. cit. p. 170
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HWhen Germany's flag covers and protects this huge empire,
to whom will the sceptre of the universe belong? Who will impose
her will on other nations enfeebled orjdecadent? Is it not Germany
who will have the mission of assuring peace to the world? Russia,
a huge giant in process of formation and with feet of clay, will be
absorbed by her internal and economic difficulties. England, stronger
in appearance than in reality, will doubtless see her colonies sep-
arate from her and will wear herself out in barren struggles. France
a prey to her domestic strife and quarrels, will sink more and more
into final ruin. As for Italy, she will have enough to do if she
wishes to bestow tranquillity on her children. The future, therefore,
belongs to Germany with whom Austria will unite if she his a desire to
live." 4
Utterance such as this from a young nation startled the old
established ones from their smug complacency, especially when the
pretensions to world empire were backed up by such manifestations as
the commercial expansion, the enlarged navy and activities of the
Navy League, the Drang Nach Osten movement toward Asiatic Turkey, and
the ambitions of the Pan-German League.
The latter was founded in 1886 and reorganized in 1893 with-
out formal government sanction, but it inflamed the national spirit.
Their propaganda on behalf of German expansion embraced cultural,
political and economic aspects. The object waste revive German nation-
al sentiment, preserve German thought and customs in Europe and across
the seas where German colonists were found, and weld their national-
ists everywhere into a compact mass as a nucleus for the spread of
5
German Kultur. Their political dream was of Incorporating and con-
trolling all Teutonic people in Central Europe between the Baltic
and Alps, and from there to push southeast through t he Balkans toward
6
Asia Minor. To pave the way for this political union they desired
4. Tardleu, Andre' op. cit. p. 51-2
5. Rose, J. n. op. cit. p. 64, also Davis, W. S. op. cit. ch.XVII
6. Corns tock, G. C "Why Germany Wanted War", p. 52
4»
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to form an economic unit by extending the existing Customs Union
through Middle Europe with a protective tariff against outside
7
nation.
In 1902 at Aix-la-Chapelle the Kaiser confessed that, "it
8 -
is to the empire of the world that the German genius aspires."
What nation has not dreamed of someday securing its "place in the
sun"? However, national aspirations are not always proclaimed aloud
in such an arrogant manner. Seymour says that the opposing elements
of confidence and fear that Germany might be blocked from her dreams
of dominion produced the tone of b elligerence manifested in Germany
9
around 1900.
The basis may have been in economic conditions, but it was
largely these bellicose manifestations which alarmed the people of
England and France and caused them ultimately to draw together for
mutual support.
7. Prothero, G. W. "German Policy Before the War", p. 30-1
8. Ogg. F . A. "Ger.nan Ambition for World Power",. p. 33
9. Seymour, Charles op. cit. p. 109
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5» ATTEMPTS TOWARD ANGLO-GERMAN ALLIANCE
There had been no strong traditional enmity between Eng-
land and Germany, the greatest fears of rivalry really lay in the
future. 3ismarck's policy had been to keep England in friendly
cooperation with the Triple Alliance and previous efforts toward a
1
closer union have already been mentioned.
Of English attempts at a rapprochement in the spring of
1898 there is very little documentary evidence in the British ar-
chives, for the parleys were in Joseph Chamberlain's &ands and were
ch
gtreated as a private matter. Until his Memoirs are published our
information must come for the most part from Die Grosse Politik
which treats t he subject fully from the official German documents.
Tentative suggestions were made by Chamberlain in confer-
ence with Count Hatzfeldt on March 29 and April 25, but the way had
been opened by previous conversation between Lord Balfour and Hatz-
feldt, the generaljt enor of which was that there was no essential
conflict between German and English interests.
Bulow instructed Hatzfeldt that Germany could not consider
a treaty unless it was ratified by Parliament, as otherwise, if a
change in ministry occurred, England could easily elude her treaty
obligations should a war c ome . Brandenburg interprets his motives
as being afraid if the t reaty were made and published and then re-
jected by Parliament, that Germany would be hopelessly compromised
with Russi a.
1. See pages 7&9
2. Gooch and Temper ley op. clt. Intro, to vol.11, also Ward and
Gooch op. cit. p. 257 and 276
3« Johnson and Bickford op. clt. p. 25 from "pie Grosse Politik"
XIV 3778,3779,3780.
4. Brandenburg, Erich op. clt. p. 107-8
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Since the accession of the new Tsar in 1894- there had
grown up a seemingly cordial feeling between the cousins "Willy
and Nicky". Germany's exposed eastern frontier made it advisable
to keep diplomatic relations friendly. She felt that an Anglo-Ger-
man treaty directed against Russia and France was not worth the risk
when the English navy would be of little value in helping defend
German frontiers. The few colonial concessions which England might
give were too cheap a price to pay for a possible war with Russia.
The Kaiser even sounded out the Tsar, telling him of the negotia-
tions and asking what Russia would offer Germany if the English
5
offer were refusea. However, Bulow not trusting Russian policy,
did not wish to definitely close the subject with England for he
wanted to keep her friendly as a spard card against Russia in case
6
the need arose.
After Salisbury's recuperation and return, the proposi-
tions were place before him, but he did not favor any formal binding
treaty until a case of necessity arose through actual serious menace
to British interefets. "Finally, both sides agreed it would be bet-
ter first to prepare public opinion and dispel the feeling of ill
humor. So the idea of an allinace remained a •possibility of the
7
future' (Bulow)".
Attempts at an alliance from this until their abandonment
in 1902 show a pendulum-like movement between rapprochement and
the Increasing causes of friction. Throughout this period 1898-1902,
5» Johnson and Bickford op. clt. p. 31
6. Brandenburg, Erich op. cit. p.107-8
7. Hammann, Otto op. cit. p. 79
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the two Governments maintained an officially friendly and correct
attitude, but between the people of the two nations, stirred by
a hostile press, the breach became wider.
In October 1899 the long threatening Boer War broke out.
Public opinion on the Continent in general favored the South African
republics and the press, particularly in France and Germany, bitter-
ly criticized the British policy. The Kaiser, however, wishing to
erase the memory of the ill-considered telegram of 1895 in view of
the possibility of further negotiations with England, chose this
as an auspicious moment for a visit to his grandmother, Q,ueen Vic-
toria. Von 3ulow who accompanied him, had conversation with Cham-
berlain and in his speech at Leicester, November 30, Chamberlain
propounded the idea of an Analo-German-United States alliance:
"If union between England and America is a powerful factor in the
cause of peace, a new Triple Alliance between the Teutonic race
and the two great b ranches of t he ^nglo-Saxon race will be a still
8
more potent influence in the future of the world."
Immediately following this in 1900 relations became
strained again. In the last part of 1899 had occurr_ed the Bundesrat
Incident. Several German mall steamers suspected of carrying con-
traband had been stopped and searched off the coast of Africa by
3ritlsh c rulsers
. The Bundesrat had o een detained, but on protest
from the German Government the British Government had ordered its
immediate release, a suitable compensation paid to the German
Shipping Co., and an assurance that German ships would not again
8. Seymour, Charles op. cit. p. 133, quoted in Annual Register
1899 p. 227
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9
be molested on mere suspicion. However, indignation ran high in
Germany and von Tirpitz exploited the indicent to show the need of
an adequate protective German navy in support of the new Navy bill
of 1900.
In the meantime, attempts to form another coalition against
England were in progress. The initiative seems to have come from
10
Russia, although Stuart attributes it to a suggestion of the !^ueen
of Holland made to the Russian Tsar. On the other hand, Sir Valen-
11
tine Chlrol says he has been assured that, "The original suggestion
of French, Russian and German intervention to stop the war was made
in one of the many private letters with which the German Emperor
constantly importuned the Tsar in the shape of an appeal to follow
up the generous initiative he had taken in inviting the Powers to
the peace Conference of the Hague, by an opportune word of friendly
remonstrance in London against the danger to the peace of the world
involved in the South African War."
The facts we are sure of are that the Russian Ambassador
Muravieff proposed in Psris and Berlin in February and March 1900
the united intervention of the three powers between England and the
Boers. The German office would not consider it except on the con-
dition that the three powers should mutually guarantee the integrity
12
of their territories. To France this w ould mean acquiescence in
the Treaty of Frankfort and giving up hopes of the revanche. As
the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine was still a vital part of their policy
92 Ward and Gooch op. cit. p. 279
10. Stuart, G. H. op. cit. p. 4-0
11. Ward and Gooch op. cit. p. 280 footnote, ch. IV written oy Sir
Valentine Chirol, Director or the Foreign Department of the
Times .
12. Prothero, G. W. op. cit. p. 69-70 also Brandenburg, Erich op.
cit. p. 142
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the offer was refused and the attempted coaltlon collapsed.
However, on President Kruger's visit to the European cap-
itals, the Kaiser officially refused t o receive him, but the incon-
sistence of his policy is known in the advice he sent to Edward,
the Prince of .Vales, on February 4, 1900 as to the conduct of the
13
war and c omparing it to a club football match. This letter was
published in the English Blue Book and impaired feeling on both
sides. A German's own estimate of the effect of this is, "This is
a genuine instance of those irresponsible actions of the Kaiser
which, however little influence they exerted in Individual cases
on the march of events, roused so much ill-feeling in other nations
14
and their leaders against himself and German policy."
On the other side, German official opinion became highly
indignant when the King of Portugal was royally received on board
theEnglish fleet at Lisbon and the Treaty of Windsor became known,
for this seemed to nullify the secret Anglo-German agreement con-
cerning the Portuguese colonies. Fresh fuel was added over the un-
successful German efforts to secure a terminus for the Bagdad rail-
way at Koweit which had been blocked by the English support of the
Sheik. Again, there had been friction over the Canadian preferen-
tial tariff granted toteritish imports in violation of the treaty of
1865 between Britain and the German Zollverein which had granted
German e quality in the British c olonies with those of the mother
country. Whe:. the dispute arose, England with a year's notice
terminated the treaty and would make no new one which did not
13. Brandenburg, Erich op. cit. p. 144 quotes "Grosse Politik" XV
553
14. Ibid. p. 145
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recognize the fiscal autonomy of the British dominion. Then Ger-
many had excepted Canada from the benefit of the most-favored-nation
clause, levied her highest tariff to which Candda retaliated by a
15
surtax, and controversy followed.
The pendulum soon swung back and there was an approach at
cooperation again during the Boxer troubles in China in the summer
of 1900. On October 16, was concluded the Yangste Convention in
which both England and Germany agreed to observe the principle of
the open door in China and "The two Government agree on their part
to uphold the same for all Chinese territory as far as they can ex-
16
ercise influence. "
This last phrase was misinterpreted by Russia as quoted
in the Russian memorandum, "that ports on rivers and littoral of
China wherever the two Governments exercise their influence, should
remain free and open to commerce." Salisbury's reply to Mr. Charles
Hardinge after receipt of the Memorandum states that, "Russia Implies
that the action of Great Britain and Germany is limited to those
provinces in which they have special interests, but the original in-
tention is that action extend to the whole of the Chinese Empire as
17
far as the two powers can exercise influence."
In spite of this explanation and mrning, the following
year (1901) Russia obtained a concession on the left bank of the
Pei-ho River in Immediate proximity to T lent Gin' and England approached
15« Ashley, Percy op. cit. p. 101 also Ward & Gooch op. cit. p. 301-2
16. Gooch and Temperley op. cit. ch. I, p.15, enclosure no. 17»
17. Ibid. p. 18 enclosure no. 21
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Germany as to upholding the agreement against such transactions.
Bulow in the Reichstag March 15 stated that there were no German
interests of Importance in Manchuria, the fate of that province was
a matter of absolute indifference t o Germany, and the agreement of
18
1900 was in no sense concerned with Manchuria.
The English considered the clause to maintain unimpaired
the integrity of the Chinese Empire as applicable to the province
of Manchuria, while Germany thought themselves not oound to enter
this Russian controversy on the ground that they did not exercise
influence in that part of the Chinese Empire. This difference in
interpretation seriously affected t he new attempts for an Anglo-
German defensive alliance which had been reopened.
The initiative in 1901 is ascribed by British documents
to have come from Baron von Eckardstein who was the Secretary in
charge of the German Embassy at London during the absence of Count
Hatzfeldt, but the Germans on their side say that English fear of
a Russc-United States rapprochement led to the renewed activities.
According to the English version, a despatch dated March 18, 1901
19
from L:rd Lansdowne to Sir Frank Lascelles, Ambassador to Berlin,
tells of Eckardstein sounding him in regard to ajdefensive alliance
against Russia and France. The proposal was that so long as Ger-
many or England was attacked by only one of the other two powers,
the Alliance would not be operative, but it would call for mutual
20
assistance in case of attack by both powers. Lansdowne replied
18. Ibid. p. 26
19« Lord Lansdowne had been appointed Foreign Minister in 1900
20. Gooch and Temperley. op. cit. ch.X p.60-1, enclosure no. 77
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that there were many difficulties which would require careful
consideration.
On the return of Salisbury and Hatzfeldt in the late sprmg,
conversations were resumed and the G-erman proposals demanded that
the Triple Alliance be received into the compact and maybe eventual-
ly include Japan, and also required that it receive Parliamentary
ratification. Salisbury doubted his ability to carry Parliament on
this question as evidenced in his memorandum of May 29, 1901 which
states that the British Government cannot undertake to declare war
for any purpose unless the country approves. If public opinion is
against it, the Government will be turned out. The treaty would
have to be laid openly and ratified by Parliament and there was im-
propriety in attempting to determine by secret contract the future
21
conduct of a Republican Assembly upon an issue of peace or war.
Besides, there was the question as t o whether England would
get enough in return for heloing defend the German, Austrian and
22
Italian frontiers. The Kaiser stated to Edward VII on August 25,
1901 at Wilhelmshohe that the Germans would have nothing to do with
the treaty unless it were ratified by Parliament and their allies
23
were included.
The ministers of both countries were suspicious and cau-
tious, so negotiations were practically dropped during the summer
vacation months. In the autumn there occurred more hostile out-
breaks
_
ln the press. German newspapers launched venomous attacks
21-lbid. p. 68 no. 36
22. Edward VII had ascendea the throne January 22, 1901.
23* Hamnann, Otto op. cit. p. 113
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upon the conduct of the British troops in South Africa and the
massing of the non-combatant population into concentration camps.
Chamberlain in a speech at Edinburgh October 25, answered that the
military measures might be severe, but a worse precedent could be
found in those practices of other nations, referring among other
24 \^
instances to those of the German troops during the war of 1870.
This was scathingly replied to by Bulow in the Reichstag in Jan-
uary .
In the meanwhile the English ministers had decided that
while an alliance with Germany might be possible, one which included
the Triple Alliance was out of the question, so on December 19, 1901,
Lansdowne appraoched Count Metternich, who had succeeded Hatzfeldt.
He inquired whether, instead of a formal alliance, Germany w ouId
consider a common interest proposal, to which Metternich replied
that it was a case of the whole or none and in view of the public
feeling in the two countries, they would be unable to work on a
25
treaty at that time.
On January 30, 1902 the German suggestion of an alliance
between Great Britain, Japan and Germany made in 1899 bore fruit in
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, but without the participation of Ger-
26
many. Japan became England's s. Idler in the Far East in this
first formal pact that England had entered into since her days of
splendid isolation. She was in a better position to disregard the
German offer and this was further confirmee on February 8, 1902
24. Ward and Gooch op. cit. p. 284
25« Gooch and Temperley op. cit. p. 82, no. 94 Lansdowne to Las-
celles December 1901.
26. Rohrback, Paul. "German World Policies" (tr:ns. Von Mach
1915) p. 158
0
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when Edward VII saw Eckardstein privately after a big ofiicial din-
ner at Marlbonough House and said:
"The renewed abuse of England in the German press and the
unfriendly
.
and sarcastic remarks of Count Bulow in the Reichstag have
aroused so much resentment among my Ministers and in public opinion
that for a long time at least, there can be no more question of
Great Britain and Germany working together in any conceivable matter.
TTe arebeing urged more strongly than ever by France to come to an
agreement with her in all colonial disputes and it will probably be
best in the end to make such a settlement, because England only wants
peace and quiet and to live on a friendly footing with all other
countries . '
So the attempts at an Anglo-German entente were abandoned.
28
"Germany did not reject the alliance --she lost it." As Brandenburg
expresses it, "The English had offerend us their hand and had with-
drawn it when we made the conditions of acceptance too onerous for
fulfilment. They never came back to us. They went instead to our
29
enemies .
"
27. Lee, Sir Sidney. "Life of Edward VII" Vol. II, p. 144 quotes
Baron von Eckardsteln-- MTen Years at the Court of St. James."
p. 230
28. Johnson and Biskforc op. cit. p. 57
29 • Brandenburg, Erich op. cit. p. 181
r•
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6 . RESUME OF GENERAL CAUSES OF THE FAILURE OF THE ANGLO-GERMAN
RAFFROCHEMENT
After following the checkered course of the Anglo-German
pourparlers from 1893-1902, a general resume is necessary in order
to understand the factors underlying their failure, so we may get
a clearer understanding of why England was so willing to turn to
France. The causes may be generally classified as economic, poli-
tical and psychological.
Under the first group we may place the previously dis-
cussed topics of the Bagdad Railway project, the less important
question of the Canadian tariff, and the steadily increasing indus-
trial development of Germany resulting in keen commercial rivalry
which in turn led to colonial friction and an enormously increased
navy
.
The importance of the commercial rivalry is well ex-
pressed by Whelpley: "In the great total of German trade and in
the rapidity with which it has risen to i"ts present volume and
value lies the reason for the anti-German agitation in England. On
the surface this antagonism is political and relates to armaments,
but its roots lie in the trade of the world and it is fed upon
1
commercial rivalry."
Othere believe that it t akes more than commercial riv-
alry to inflame the masses of people, which may be accepted as large-
ly true, as long as the cost of their economic standard of living is
1. Whelpley, J. D . op. cit. p. 42
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not materially affected, but this does not exclude commerce as one
of the main causes even if it may not be the most potent. Hammann
analyzes it thus:
"It will not do to make English commercial jealousy respon-
sible for the change in Anglo- German relations. This jealousy had
repeatedly disturbed relations and helped hinder and impede the re-
t+wturn to mutual confidence, but if this had been the prime motive
in English policy, the doors in all England's possessions would scarce
ly have remained open to the German merchant as was actually the case.
[There was being agitated in England a strong movement against free
T,rade even at this timel] HNor was the rapprochement frustrated
so much by the increase itself in the German navy as by the politi-
cal propaganda that was let loose" "The exaggeration of Germany 1
claio^to sea power actually brought about the Anglo-German estrange-
ment."
Turning now to the political side and summing up, we find
a series of misunderstandings and suspicions. Probably the most out-
standing are those of the suspected German support of the 3oers, the
Bundesrat incident, and the European attempts at a coalition against
England. Then there was the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of Windsor,
Samoan trouble, the difference over the Yangste Treaty interpretation,
and the Anglo-Jap Alliance excluding Germany. Besides these, the
Pan-German movement c aused alarm, especially in its Drang Nach Osten
policy which aimed to put Turkey under the political tutelage of
Germany as well as being economically dependent. Added yet, there
was the apparent cordiality between Russia and Germany while Russia
was still England's enemy. Then there was the slowly growing en-
tente between England and France as mutual recognition of Germany as
their common rival began to dawn upon them. Last, we may say that
when the influence of Queen Victoria, who died in 1901, ana of Salis-
bury who retired in 1902, was removed, the breach quickly widened.
2. Hammann, Otto, op. clt. p. 251-3
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Most important of all probably in determining the trend
of events are thosejpsychological factors which are so hard t o de-
fine because of their intangible nature. For this very reason,
however, they are often more powerful agents t han those actual
material things which we may see and deal with accordingly.
The difference in ideals and temperament caused the Brit-
ish air of superiority and the new German assert iveness to clash.
Many of the fundamental elements of G-erman policy were t he natural
outcome of her own economic growth and of the general e conomic
conditions of the world, but the suspicions of the otherjpowers in
defending their own situation was chiefly due to the unfortunate
manner in which the German policy was so often asserted. The Ger-
mans felt that world dominion was their rightful goal and the chief
obstacle to its attainment was the British Empire, while Britain
naturally resented any challenge to the preeminent position she
had held so long.
Ill-considered speeches of the Ministers of both sides
had engendered more misunderstanding, as for instance, the Kruger
telegram, Chamberlain's Edinburgh s peech, Billow's Reichstag ad-
dresses, and bombastic utterances of the Kaiser. Mutual suspicions
had been further fanned into bitterness by the press of both count-
ries. "Publicists and Journalists dissected Anglo-German relations
from every conceivable view point, exaggerated differences and
minimized points of common interests. On both sides facts were
garbled, motives imputed, official statements belittled, and an
*
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outrageous lack of perspective revealed. There was not enough ef-
3
fort to discover the other nation's point of view."
The whole question of why the attempted rapprochement
failed may be summed up in a quotation from Brooks: "in diplomacy
the spirit is everything. If there is confidence, good-will, and
a sincere desire for conciliation, the most formidable looking is-
sue proves easy of solution. If none of these qualities and condi-
tions are present, then t he most trivial issue may engender a crisis
7. GENERAL FACTORS LEADING T Q TEE ANGLO-FRENCH ENTENTE
It has been stated that England and France were d rawn
into an understanding by the common fear and suspicion of Germany
1
rather than through natural instincts of friendship. The Anglo-
German basis of rivalry has already been discussed. The main fac-
tors underlying strained Franco-German relations were the ancient
hatreds, the "constant rattling of the German sabre" since 1870,
and the more recent recognition that with her stationary popula-
tion, it was hopeless for France to cope alone with German expan-
sion on land and her growth of power. More specifically, "between
France and Germany was still a valley of dry bones in Alsace-Lor-
2
ralne that a breath would people with armed men," or as Rose
tersely expressed it, "the crux of the Franco-German trouble is
3
at Metz."
It is very likely true that there were few natural
instincts of friendship to draw France and England t op;ether. It
3« Schmitt, B. E. op. clt. p. 154-
4. Brooks, Sidney "England and Germany" in Atlantic Monthly
May 1910, p. 620 !
1. Holt and Chilton op. cit. p. 314-
2. Young, George. "Nationalism and War in the Near East." p. 153
3. Rose, J. H. op. .cit. p. 110
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was more of a business proposition made to the advantage of each
and became possible largely because both had the requisite mat-
erials essential to a mutual bargain.
On the economic side the difference in the type of in-
dustrial production of each oountry made them supplement rather
than antagonize one another as rivals. In the words of King Ed-
ward, "I know of no two countries whose prosperity is more inter-
4
dependent." England was France's best single customer, 30 per
5
cent of the total French export going to England in 1902.
Political Issues furthering a rapprochement were the
desires for mutual leeway in Egyptian and Moroccan affairs, and
a need to establish a more even balance of power in order t o des-
troy the German hegemony. The evident satisfaction of Germany
over t he Fashoda tension had shown both countries that it was
time to put an end to the German policy of playing off one
against the other in order to further her own prestige. The inter-
est and efforts toward reconciliation of certain officials in
both countries aided much in preparing the way, also.
Aside from the material factors, we must not undervalue
those unconscious motives which add so much at times toward
changing fend shaping policies. Many bitter criticisms had ap-
peared in the French press during the Boer war, to be retaliated
in England over the Dreyfus affair. There had been also, an
apparent British s corn for the inconsistent and temperamental
4. Coolidge, A . C. "A Quarter Century of Franco-British Rela-
tions" p. 13
5. Jaray, G. L. "La Politique Franco-Anglaise et L' Arbitrage
International", p. 69

French and a corresponding French hatred and c ontempt for the
so-called gross and stupid English, but their ideals of culture
and democratic living were not really so incompatible. The French
recognized English achievement as something to be admired and
even the British suoeriority yielded to the charm of French cul-
6
ture. An entente was not such a seemingly difficult goal to
attain after all.
6. Ccolidge, A • C op. cit. p.
5
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III ACTUAL STEPS IN THE FORMATION OF THE ENTENTE
UNOFFICIAL EFFORTS LEADING TO THE TREATY OF ARB ITRATION
Among the earliest records we have of unofficial efforts
toward bringing the two nations closser together is in 1896. In
that year a society of "Entente|Cordial--associat ion for the devel-
opment of more cordial relations between the United Kingdom and
France" vras formed in London with the encouragement of the Prince
of Wales. ^ Its object as stated wast o use its influence to dev-
elop a better knowledge and higher appreciation of the two nations
and promote friendly intercourse and common action between them
socially and <x> mmercially .
Major Roper-Park ingt on, President of the English Associa-
tion of the Entente Cordiale (a group composed mostly of members
of Parliament) tried to form a like association in France. At a
reunion in the Grand Hotel in Paris, M . de Lanessan was elected
President and a resolution adopted: "The reunion privee held at
the Grand Hotel April 15, 1897 decided to form in Paris a group
Mving for an object the development of cordial relations between
the French and English people in view of the prosperity of the
2
two c ountries and the friendly regulation of all their interests."
This was quoted in Le Matin April 16. The society campaigned a-
mong the Chambers of Commerce for their support, but there was
some hesitation to publicly approve. It was thought best to
educate public opinion fir s t, but the Fashoda Incident intervened,
1. Lanessan, J. L. de . "Histolre de L'Entente Cordiale Franco-
Anglaise" p. 218
2. Ibid. p. 231

73
bringing so much hostility that the attempts were abandoned for
the time.
3
The next initiative came from Mr. Thomas Barclay through
whose efforts the British Chambers of Commerce were invited to meet
in Paris in 1900. Barclay thought that the best way to bring about
an Entente and produce better feeling was t o have an object of a
non-material character which people could agree about without any
sacrifice of interest on either side. Such a rallying point might
be a permanent treaty of arbitration.
He immediately began a campaign to stimulate interest
through the chambers of commerce, municipal councils, trade unions,
leading politicians, articles in papers, and public addresses, so
that he could be sure of French support before approaching Eng-
land. Throughout 1901 and 1902 resolutions in favor of the pro-
posed treaty were passed both in France and England by chambers
of commerce, trade associations, peace societies, and municipal
councils, showing that the movement was gaining headway.
OFFICIAL DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS
On the diplomatic side, conversations relative to condi-
tions in Morocco and Siam were going on between Lord Lansdowne and
M. Paul Cambon (French Ambassador) all during 1902-03, as is
shown in communications between Lansdowne and Sir Edmund Monson
5
(British Ambassador.) These concerned an arrangement for the
partition of Slam into spheres of influence and the prospective
3. President of the British Chamber of Commerce in Paris in 1900.
Barclay, Sir Thomas "Thirty Years Anglo-French Reminiscences"
p. 195
5. G-ooch and Temperley op. cit. ch.XIV
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liquidation of Morocco.
The situation in Morocco had not become acute until
recently. British interests centered mainly in her trade r elat ions
and on preventing any strong nation from fortifying the coast
opposite Gibraltar. French interest became more pronounced after
the loss of the Egyptian Sudan. The French were heavy creditors
of the Moroccan Government and commercial agreements were made
in 1901-02 with the Sultan to facilitate the peaceful penetration
of the country by French trade. Also diplomatic accords secured
the right for the French to police t he border between Morocco
and Algeria. In 1905 French army officers were put in control
of native Moroccan troops, so France had definitely established
herself in the country, but she had found obstacles to her pol-
icy in to th British and German officials in Morocco and a conflict
was likely to occur unless some settlement could be made.
An excellent statement of French policy is given in a
despatch from Lansdowne to Monson August 6, 1902, in which Lans-
6
downe quotes Cambon's setting forth of Delcasse's ideas:
"The French Government were 'partisans du statu quo*
and conceived that in this respect they did not differ from us.
They had colonial dominions amply sufficient not only for present
wants, but for wants for generations to oome. They had passed
out of the period of expansion and had no wish to add to their
responsibilities by further acquisitions. The colonial policy
of France w&s therefore essentially conservative and in pursuit
of such a policy M« Delcasse believed that it would be pobBible
for them to move in accordance with us. This seemed to him all
the easier because we were not really competitors. The French did
not produce the sax.e commodities as we did, and they were there-
fore not rivals of ours in markets of the world as were the
United States and Germany. All that France t herefore desired was
6. Ibid. p. 264-6, enclosure no. 322
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to ensure the security of what she already possessed. So far as
Delcasse' could see, there were only two points at which her posi-
tion was insecure --Si am and Morocco."
Affairs in South Africa and Venezuela occupied the minds
of British statesmen at this point so negotiations for a general
settlement were postponed, but efforts toward an arbitration treaty
continued. Monson to Lansdowne May 22, 1903 stated that "M. d'
Estournelles de Constant-Deputy--has busied himself among his col-
leagues in the Chamber for the purpose of forming a g roup (in ac-
cordance with French Parliamentary system) with the object of
pushing propaganda for an Arbitration Treaty The real author
of the campaign in favour of the scheme of an Arbitration Treaty
is Mr. Thomas Barclay, a former President of the British Chamber
7
of Commerce at ps.ris."
On June 13, 1903 the Commercial Committee of the House
of Commons sent an Invitation to visit the 3ritish Parliament to
the group in the French Parliament interested in international
arbitration. The visit took place in July and at a banquet offered
the French deputies and senators at Westminster Palace, many of
the leading diplomats of both countries were present , --Balfour,
Chamberlain, Campbell-Baunerman, Asquith, Dilke, Caillaux, Lanessan,
8
de Constant, etc. At this banquet Chamberlain said, "I believe
in an Entente Cordlale between the two countries a«d thi s fintente-
Gordiale botwccn trhe t-we oountrleg and this Entente depends less
K
on conventions and treaties than on mutual sympaty between the two
9 A
people .
"
7. Ibid. p. 290 enclosure no. 353
8. Lanessan, J. L. de . op. cit. p. 248-9
9. Ibid. p. 252
W
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Much in the way of gaining mutual sympathy had already
been accomplished. The French capital had finally been won over
largely through the influence of the visit of King Edward VII in
May 1903* A.s Prince of Wales he had been a popular figure in
France and they succumbed once more to his tact and charm when
he came in 1903 in his role as King. As a people the French are
Inclined to be rather impulsive, sensitive, their enthusiasm is
easily kindled, and they are peculiarly susceptible to sentimen-
tal appeal. As Gitotoons says, "symbols count far more than real-
10
lties with the French." JUst as Benjamin Franklin won the pop-
ular fancy during the days of the American Revolution, the Rus-
sian Naval officers on their visit before the Dual Alliance, and
Lindbergh in our own day, so Edward VII struck the note of friend
ship when in speaking to the members of the British Chamber of
Commerce in Paris he said, "the days of conflict between the two
11
countries are, I trust, happily over."
President Loubet's return visit was paid in July and
Delcasse kbd a long personal interview with Lansdowne at which it
was recognized that it was not impossible to find for each of the
problems with which they were confronted, a solution equally ad-
12
vantageous to both parties.
On October 14, 1903 a Treaty of Arbitration was signed
This was the first of its kind among the great European nations.
It was accompanied by an official note stating, that it was "the
10. Gibbons, H. A. "The New Map of Asia", p. 243
11. Stuart, G. H. op. cit. p. 113
12. Gooch and Temperley op. cit. p. 294-7, enclosure no. 357
Lansdowne to Monson.
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outcome of the movement in both countries in favor of affirming
the general principle of recourse to arbitration, whenever that
13
method can be safely and conveniently adopted."
NEGOTIATING AND DRAFTING- TREATY OF 1904
With the signing of the Arbitration Treaty to prepare
the way, negotiations were resumed for settling the outstanding
points of difficulty. In spite of the questions causing friction
between England and Francefbeing purely colonial ones, the fear of
Germany lay beneath the surface of the desire for this settle-
ment. Lansdowne to Monson July 2, 1903 told of an interview with
14
M. Etienne concerning the prospective entente, "at the conclusion
of which M. Etienne expressed the belief that the most serious
menace to the peace of Europe lay in Germany, that a good under-
standing between France and England was the only means of holding
German designs in check, and that if such an understanding was
arrived at, England would find that France would be able to exer-
cise a salutary influence over Russia and thereby relieve us from
15
many of our troubles with that country."
There seems to have been five actual steps taken in
drafting the texts of the treaty if we wish to outline the pro-
cess .
1. Lansdowne consulted his colleagues and also Lord
Cromer (British Consul-General and Ap;ent in Egypt) as weil as
13. Barclay, Sir Thomas op. cit. p. 234
14. Vice President of the French Chamber of Deputies
15* Gooch and Temperley op. cit. p. 292-3 , enclosure no. 356
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Sir Eldon Gorst (financial advisor to Egyptian Government 1898-
1904, later assistant under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs).
Then he laid before Cambon October 1, 1903, unofficially and con-
fidentially, a statement of the conditions upon which they would
16
be disposed to agree. The French unofficial answer was received
17
October 26.
2. Following this, a series of official drafts were
prepared during December-February 1904 b the British Foreign Of-
fice .
3. Cambon presented the French drafts to Lansdowne
March 21, 1904 and Lansdowne made a number of suggestions for
amendments
.
4. Cambon presented revised drafts on March 29-30 em-
bodying some of Lansdowne' e amendments. Other suggestions for
amendments were then discussed. Tnese related mostly to the
Spanish c oast line in Morocco, the Egyptian debt question, mut-
ual commercial privileges in Egypt and Morocco, the Suez Canal
control, as well as negotiations concerning compensations for
Newfoundland in Nigeria, and over gaining French diplomatic
support so there would be mutual help in obtaining the execution
18
of the declaration.
5« The last step was taken when the final text was
19
agreed upon Aprilfrand the treaties signed April 8, 1904.
16. Ibid p. 311-17, enclosure no.369--Lansdowne to Cambon
17* Ibid p. 320-23, enclosure no. 373--Cambon to Lansdowne
18. Ibid p. 364-73, enclosure no .4l6--Lansdowne to Monson April
8, 1904
19. Ibid. p.373, enclosure no. 417 gives outline of drafting steps.
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IV THE TREATY OF APRIL 8, 1904
1. GENERAL NATURE OF THE AGREEMENT
"The Franco-3rit ish^as inaugurated in 1904 was not an
alliance in the strict s;nse of the word, for there were no formal
promises of military or naval support."''" Alliances require that
an issue be stated rather definitely and then be backed up and
neither country was willing to go quite so far at this time.
Instead of a defensive military convention, the Entente
Cordiale was merely an understanding on those issues which had
long been a source of conflict between the two c ountries ana on
the face of it presented little more than an adjustment o f oolon-
ial difficulties through mutual concessions and guarantees. Even
Article 9 of the declaration concerning Egypt and Morocco, pro-
viding for mutual diplomatic support was not directed against any
definitely specified country or coalition. Yet, under the sur-
face was the feeling that with a treaty based on such broad gen-
eral interests, it was almoet inevitable that cooperation would
develop naturally in case questionsof world-wide importance should
arise
.
Let Delcasse' himself speak on the nature of this arrange-
ment: "The Convention is equally advantageous to the two nations,
in that each one of them obtains satisfaction upon the points
which concern them most. And it is very fortunate that it should
be thus, since th i s arrangement Instead of being a nest for
1. Hayes, C. 1/ H. "Political and Social History of Modern
Europe" (1315-1914) p. 702
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quarrels has had for its object the Intent to wipe away every-
thing which might counterbalance the superior reasons and power-
ful interests w hich command England and France to live in confi-
2
dence and in good understanding."
2. TERMS OF SETTLEMENT
The agreement as signed by Lansdowne and Cambon con-
sisted of two declarations, one concerning Egypt and Morocco,
—
the other, Siam, Madagascar and the New Hebrides. There was also
a convention relative to Newfoundland and territory in Central and
West flfrica. Attached to the declaration on Egypt was a Khedlv-
ial decree of sixty-eight articles laying down regulations for
administering the Egyptian debt, also, there were five secret
articles not made public until 1911. The provisions of the treaty
were as follows: Declaration relative to Egypt and .Morocco.
This declaration consisted of Kiln* articles of which
the general import wae a mutual recognition of the paramount
interests of G-reat 5ritain in Egypt ana France in Morocco.
Before considering this declaration some attention should
be given to the earlier relations of France and England in Egypt-
French interest in Egypt grew largely out of her trade relations
with the Levant. England saw in Egypt the key to the East and
India. Since the time of Napoleon's Egyptian campaign 1793-99|
the two nations have had rival interests there. The Suez Canal
was a French engineering project, but the British gained the con-
trolllng Interest by the purchase on November 25 . 1375 of the
2. Stuart, G. H. p.131 quotes "Annales de la Chambre" Vol.
741, p. 404
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Khedive's shares of Canal stock when the Egyptian Government
had become bankrupt. The Canal has o een called "the spiaal cord
of the British Empire" and in order t o protect it permanently,
it was necessary to control Egypt. A financial crisis in 1876
led England and France (the heaviest creditors) to appoint sup-
ervisors over t he finances and this was strengthened into a
Dual Control in 1880.
Egyptian resentment over foreign interference manifested
itself in the Nationalistic uprising under Arabl Pasha in 1880-
1882. The French were having trouble at home with a financial
crisis and also feared the outcome of the Triple Alliance which
had just been signed. Consequently France did not feel in a
position to intervene with the 3ritish in Egypt at this Juncture
so through her refusal to cooperate, she lost her sphere of in-
fluence. In 1833 the Dual Control was abolished by Khedivial
decree and a sole British advisor took its place, Britain declar-
ing it her intention to remain im the country only long enough to
reestablish order and prosperity. She set 1888 as the date of
evacuation, Out the occupation had continued in spite of French
protests
.
Now In regard t o Egypt
,
G-reat 3ritain declared she had
no intention of altering its political etatus . France recognized
the predominant position of Britain in Egypt (withdrawing her own
shadowy claims) and promisee not to raise again the question of
the temporary character of the British occupation by demanding a
time limit, nor Interfering in any other way. Adjustment was
made concerning the public debt, safeguarding the interests of
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British, French, and other creditors. The Egyptian Government
was given a free hand in the disposal of its own resources so
long as punctual payment of interest on the debt was assured.
French schools were to enjoy the same liberty as before, a French
"savant" continued to direct the Egyptian antiquities, all rights
enjoyed by the French through treaties, conventions and usage in-
cluding the coasting trade between Egyptian ports were to be
respected. Liberty of commerce was guaranteed for thirty years
with the privilege of renewal for five years at a time and Bri-
tain promised to adhere to the stipulations of the Treaty of
1388 (never made operative) insuring the neutrality and free
passage of the Suez Canal.
As for ] orocco, France also declared she had no in-
tention of altering its political status. Britain recognized
France's special interests there and agreed not to interfere in
French Intervention to maintain order in a country whose terri-
tory was coterminous for a great distance with other French
possessions in Africa. She also promised to place no obstacles
in the way of French assistance to the Sultan in bringing about
needed administrative, economic, financial, and military reforms.
There was a clause insuring commercial liberty for Britain and
France on equal terms for thirty years and Britain was confirmed
in her rights (as was Fr.nce in Egypt) gained through treaties
conventions and usages including coasting trade since 1901.
Both powers agreed not to erect fortifications on the coast
opposite Gibraltar within certain defined limits, nor allow any
other potrer to, although this clause did not apply to points
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actually held by Spain on the Moroccan shore. In consideration
of Spain's territorial and political interests, provision was
made that France should come to an understanding with her and
communicate the result to G-reat Britain when the accord was
concluded. (This was done in October 1904). The last article
provided for mutual diplomatic support in carrying out the pro-
visions of this Egyptian-Moroccan declaration.
The phrase "diplomatic support" seems to be t he keynote
of the whole understanding. Its wording was intentionally ob-
scure so that this would not oe construed as a binding pledge, but
3
leaving room for independent action and future interpretation.
The fate of Europe seemed to depend upon the nature of this in-
terpretation. What would "diplomatic support" mean to England
and France? To what wxtent would they feel bound to b ack it up?
This was answered in the crises of Algeciras, Agadir, and 1914,
4
but in 1904 it was still a question for the future to decide.
DECLARATION DEALING WITH S IAM , MADAGASCAR
AND THE NEW HEBRIDES
Slam. Both governments disclaimed any intention of annexing Siam-
ese territory, but French influence was recognized as predominant
in trie territory to the east of the v alley of the Menam River,
while Great Britain received the same freedom of action to the
west of this valley. It was really a continuation of the Declar-
atlon of January 15. 1896 which had fixed the boundaries of Slam
.
3» Grey, Viscount of Fallodon, "Twewty-five Years" p. 295 vol.1
4/ Bullard, Arthur op. cit. p. 77
•
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making the upper Mekfcng the boundary between British and French
spheres of influence. This declaration of 1904 pared down Biam
leaving practically nothing but the narrow strip of the Menartv
valley as a buffer state between the two spheres of influence.
Madagascar . Under a treaty of 1865 equal treatment had been
guaranteed all trade and in the convention of 1890 France had
agreed that the rights and immunities enjoyed by British subjects
should not be affected. However, in 1892 France laid a protec-
tive tariff g iving preference to French goods. Salisbury pro-
tested that this was a violation of the treaty rights and Hano-
taux found means of evading these rights by annexing the island.
This was done in 1896 and French goods entering were exempt from
all import tax while foreign goods were excluded by prohibitive
duties which drew constant protest from the British. Now however,
Britain abandoned her protests against the French tariff and
France made a similar concession to Britain in Zanzibar.
Nevr Hebrides . Conflict over the ownership of these islands had
resulted in disputes as t o land titles and jurisdiction over the
natives and since 1337 the islands had been administered by a
mixed English and French naval commission which had proved highly
unsatisfactory. Now in order to improve conditions arising from
lack cf adequate J urlsdict ional c ontrol , It was agreed to prepare
an arrangement to settle the difficulties in administering the
islands .
5« Moon, P. T. "imperialism and World Politics", p. 135 also
Ward and Gcoch op. clt. p. 218-22.
I
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CONVENTION SETTLING NEWFOUNDLAND DISPUTE AND
GRANTING CONCESSIONS IN WEST AND CENTRAL
AFRICA
French fishing privileges gained in the Treaty of
Utrecht 1713 had been curtailed later when Newfoundland became
a self-governing colony (1855) • The colonial assembly passed
laws (especially the Bait Act 1886) violating French rights under
the old treaty. France protested and much friction ensued. Now,
however, France gave up the right of drying fish on the Newfound-
land shore, but retained the privilege of fishing in territorial
waters and also of obtaining supplies and bait. There was a pec-
uniary indemnity for French citizens who were obliged to abandon
their shore establishments because of this settlement.
Additional concessions were granted France bj Britain
in Africa. She received a modification of territory at the mouth
of the Gambia River allowing her a water approach to territory
drained by the Upper Gambia. Also, Britain ceded a group of is-
lands known as the lies de Los w hich were of strategic import-
ance in commanding the city of Konakry , the capital of French
Guinea. Besides, there was a rectification made in the frontier
between Nigeria and the Sudan giving France a d irect route from
6
the Niger to Lake Tchad without passing through the desert land.
The second declaration and the convention had no bear-
ing on any outside Interests other than those of the two signatory
6. Text of treaty --Gooch and Temperley op. cit. ch.XV, revision
and final form. Discussion of provisions in Ward and Gooch
op. cit. p. 309-17- Pinon, R. op. cit. p. 298-302; Stuart, G.
H. op. cit. p. 117-126
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powers. They related to strictly local and personal matters,
though both Fr nee and Great Britain seemed to ignore entirely
the rights and wishes of t he original owners of the lands they
parceled out between them. Mr. G-ibson Bowles sarcastically but
aptly remarked, "The dispute between France and England was not
how little they could concede to one another; no, it w as how
7
much belonging to someone else they could concede to each other."
It was the first declaration (Egypt and Morocco) which c ontainted
the nucleus of the agreement leading to outside opposition and
resulting in a closer bond of the entente than had been patent
at first.
The five secret articles provided for possible changes
in policy altering the status of Egypt and Morocco and for con-
tingencies that might arise in connection with the Spanish hold
on the coast op^oslt^ 3-lbralter- Article I provided that economic
commercial and strategic arrangements as stated in t he open declara-
tion should reamin intact in case either goverment found themselves
constrained through force or circumstances to modify their policy
in respect to Egypt or Morocco. This meant mutual support of the
principle of commercial liberty and w ould safeguard the free pass-
age of Suez and Gibraltar.
Article II declared no present Intention of making
a change in capitulations or Judicial organization of Egypt, but
if it should be considerea desirable to do so, France v.'wuld not
7. Stuart, G. H. op. cit. p. 128
•
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refuse assent on t he understanding of a similar free hand in
Morocco
.
Article III definitely specified which part of Morocco
should come under Spanish influence if the Sultan should cease to
exercise authority over it. Spain, however, must pledge herself
notAalienate the whole or a part of the territory placed under
her jurisdiction.
Article IV provided that this arrangement was Binding
upon Britain and France even if Spain declined to enter into it.
Article V was a reference to the terms of management
and repayment of the Egyptian National debt in case the other
8
powers refused to accept the arrangements.
Sir Sidney Lee seems to think that much misrepresenta-
tion of the character and purpose of these secret articles devel-
oped later in Germany and among English writers in sympathy with
9
her, but the reason for withholding them f rom publication seems
very evident and is well expressed by Stuart: "This was a per-
fectly fair arrangement as far as Britain and. France were con-
cerned and even Spain's legitimate interests were safeguarded.
However, Spain might prefer to be consulted in advance, the Sul-
tan might object to even the possibility of a protectorate and
Germany might imagine that her interests were being Jeopardized,
so it was decided inexpedient to publish these articles with
10
the rest of the declaration."
8. Text of secret articles in Plnon, R. op. cit. Appendix Docu-
ment VIII .Discussion in Stuart, G. H« op. cit. p. 119-120;
Brandenburg, Erich op. cit. p. 202-3; Pinon, R. Ibid. p. 302-3
9. Lee, Sir Sidney op. cit. p. 25b
10. Stuart, G. H« op. cit. p. 120
i
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3. RATIFICATION OF TREATY
Public opinion had been prepared for t he treaty and on
the whole it was received with approbation in both countries.
The 3ritish Parliament expressed satisfaction over the agreement
and Lansdowne at the close of his covering despatch said concern-
ing it, "It may perhaps be permitted to the Government to hope
that in thus basing the composition of long standing differences
upon mutual concessions and in the fr^nk recognition of each
other's legitimate wants and aspirations, they may have afforded
a precedent which will contribute something to the maintenance
of international good-will and the preservation of the general
1
peace .
"
Satisfaction was not quite so general in France for
they felt that they had confirmed a certainty in return for only
a possibility, as England already seemed firmly established in
Egypt and France was not yet predominant in Morocco. There was
also sharp criticism from some quarters concerning the Newfound-
land agreement, but the general policy of an accord with England
was approved, so the treaty was ratified in the Chamber by a vote
of 443 to 105 and in the Senate 215 to 37 Delcasse remarked,
"Thus thanks to a mutual good-will we have succeeded in settling
the various questions which too long have weighed upon the rela-
tions between France and England." This was possible because
the agreement had been made a mutual bargain.
1. Grooch, G-. P. "History of Modern Europe", p. 344
2. Ward and Gooch op. cit. p. 317
3. Stuart, G . H. op. cit. p. 127
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4. PERSONALITIES RESPONSIBLE
The larger part of the credit foraringing about the en-
tente has been variously assigned by different authorities to
different men, but all seem to agree that those most instrumental
were (not in any attempted order of importance) Sir Thomas Barclay,
M. Delcasse', King Edward VII, Lord Lansdowne ana Paul Cambon.
Sir Thomas Barclay's efforts leading to the Treaty of
Arbitration of October 14, 1903 have already been discussed. Un-
official influence is often a very potent factor and Barclay's
determination to bring about a reconciliation, his campaigns to
enlist the support of the Chambers of Commerce and Trade Unions
oV both countries was largely instrumental in converting provin-
cial opinion. This left the two capitals to be won over later
through the friendly exchange of visits of the British sovereign
and the French President.
The largest share of the honors seems to be divided
between Delcasse and King Edward VII and there has been much dif-
ference of opinion as to whom the major part belongs. Giving
both their due credit, it seems that we concede to Delcasse the
title of originator of the movement. While King Edward VII and
Chamberlain were flirting with the idea of an Anglo-German
agreement up to the year 1902, M. Delcasse appears to have made
up his mind from the first to bring about an Anglo-French under-
standing. He had a full knowledge of the problems thiswould en-
tail, having been connected v ith the French Colonial Office since
1893. On becoming minister of the Foreign Office in 1898 he stated
•
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the keynote of his policy vhen he said in November ol' that year,
"I should not wish to leave this office without having re-established
1
good relations with England." We know of his attempts through
Cambon to suggest the opening of negotiations on other matters of
friction after the Fashoda settlement. Edward VII himself acknowl-
edges these efforts In the private interview he had with Baron von
Eckardsteln after the dinner at Marlborough House on February 8,1902
If we acknowledge the originating activity of Delcasse,
(in spite of Tardieu whose opinion was, "The English King was the
Initiator of the raporochement . He it was who both conceived and
3
facilitated it.") we must certainly give to Edward VII the credit
for smoothing away the persistent feeling of hostility between the
two nations and breaking the ice so that negotiations might be
carried on in a far more cordial atmosphere. His ability and
success was due both to his personality and his tr ining. He
possessed the happy faculty of saying and doing the right thing
at the right time and place. This natural tact and sympathy was
developed through the long years of his travel and association in
a social way as prince of Wales with t he diplomatic centers of
the world. R. B. Mowat calls him the first English sovereign
since William III rho may be called a European statesman. "He
knew well the persnnnel of high politics on the Continent, he
had the point of view of a great nobleman who had moved all his
4
life in diplomatic circles and had a wide experience of affairs."
He understood the effect and value of personal contact and made
1. Schmltt, B. E. op. cit. quotes from Victor Berard, "La France
et Guillaume II" 1907, p. 23
2. See page US'
3» Tardieu, Andre op. cit. p.60
4. Mowat, R. B. "History of European Diplomacy" p. 268-9
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large use of it. "He treated France as a friend with whom he had
had a misunderstanding and France, sensitive as himself, under-
5
stood the spirit of his proffered compromise." His personal pop-
ularity, as Prince of Wales, with large sections of the French
people is well expressed by one of their own nationality who said,
"The Prince of Wales? Oh, with him, it is very different. He
6
loves us. But you others, you do not love us."
This early devotion he revived on his memorable visit
as King in 1903 through the charm of his personality and the friend
ly utterances he made. The effect of his visit and speeches upon
French feeling is reflected in a report from the Belgian represen-
tative in Paris and circulated by the Belgian Foreign Ministry--
dated May 13, "It is said there (Paris) that Edward VII has won
the hearts of all the French. Seldom has such a complete change
of attitude been seen as that which has taken place in this country
7
during the last fortnight towards England and her sovereign."
The opinion of Edward's own subjects is well shown in
the speeches of two famous men--Mr. Balfour and Sir Charles Dilke.
The former stated In the House of Commons May 11, 1910: "He (Ed-
ward VII> did that which no Minister, no Cabinet, no Ambassador,
neither treaty nor protocols nor understandings, which no debates,
no banquets nor speeches w ere able to perform. He, by his person-
ality alone, brought home to the minds of millions on the Conti-
nent the friendly feelings of the country over which King Edward
8
rules." That is a general evaluation, but a specific one dealing
5. tee, Sir Sidney op. cit. p. 723
6. Staart, G. H. op. cit. p. 108 quotes Mr. A. E. Vizetelly in
"Republican France", p. 462
7. %ee , Sir Sidney op. cit. p. 241
8. Seymour, Carles, op. cit. p. 150-1
•
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with this occasion was made by Sir Charles Dilke, "The great and
sudden improvement in the relations between the English speaking
world and France is largely due to the wisdom and courtesy with
which the King made clear t o France that there was no ground for
9
the suspicions with prevailed."
Even if King Edward did not actually initiate and carry
through the negotiations, his work was as important in its field--
to prepare and sustain public opinion. The pressure and support
of public opinion is a powerful agent and a fundamental basis in
a government responsible and responsive to popular sovereignty as
is England and also France.
The Marquis of Lansdowne, British Foreign Minister,
also deserves great praise for his share in negotiating and
drafting the terms of the settlement. Gooch says that Lansdowne 's
skillful handling of the treaties ,with Japan and France revealed
10
his rare diplomatic ability. He had been in favor of a rapproche-
ment with France some time previous to actual negotiations. Bar-
clay states that Lansdowne had written him two months before Salis-
bury's resignation (which took place in July 1902) expressing
hearty concurrence in his (Barclay's) efforts to bring about an
11
arbitration treaty. The visits of Edward VII and Loubet gave
the ministers in their suites the opportunity for conversation
bearing upon actual negotiations and the burden of working out
the details of the agreements was largely placed upon Lansdowne
and the French Ambassador to the Court of St. James, M. Paul Cambon »
9» Stuart, G-. H. op. cit. p. 113 quotes "Life of Sir .Charles
Dilke" p. 501
10. Gooch, C-. P. "History of Our Time" p. 26
11. Barclay, Sir Thomas op. cit. p. 212

93
Concerning the ability of Carnbon we have tributes from
both English and French. Sir Sidney Lee characterizes him as
admirably fitted to advance the cause of Anglo-French f riendship
.
He attributes to him prudence, pertinacity, adaptability, long
sightedness, uniting charm of manner with strengjh of will and
says, "He was the ide^l instrument for carrying out the policy
12
of his chief." M. Lemonon states: "it is M • Carnbon who has
arranged the details of the relations between London and Paris
with a cleverness and skill to which one cannot give t oo much
..13
credit .
"
The whole question of apportioning the creditjseems to
be excellently summarized by Sir Sidney Lee, the eminent biograph-
er of King Edward VII, when he says, "To Delcasso must be given
credity^for bringing the negotiations to a successful issue, but
credit for influencing public opinion not only in France, but
also in England in favor of the Entente, credit for lulling the
French suspicions of 'perfide Albion 1 and English suspicions of
France, credit for creating an atmosphere in which an agreement
14
could be reached, must go to Edward VII."
5» GENERAL RESULTS OF THE ENTENTE
The importance of this Entente was e vident in its re-
sults on the two signatory powers and its more far-reaching effects
on the diplomacy of Europe and the world. It marked the end of
12. Lee, Sir Sidney op. cit. p. 217
13« Lemonon, Ernest "L'Europe et la Politique Br ittanlque"
,
p. 348
14. Lee, Sir Sidney, op. cit. p. 254
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British isolation and her re-entry ibto active participation in
European politics. With it, France freed herself from her sub-
servience to German influence and gained the courage to take
the initiative in diplomacy and maintain it. Both countries had
a mutual assurance of diplomatic support in case of opposition
from Germany.
Germany had lost her favorite instrument of foreign
policy (to continue the Anglo-French d isccrd) , her political heg-
emony of the Continent was broken, and new Continental b alance of
power restored. Von Bulow stated in the Reichstage April 12, 1904
that "from the point of view of German interests we have nothing
1
to complain of." He spoke of material interests which were not
then seriously threatened, but it was thought that the German
prestige was, and they came to feel that it was necessary to show
the world that questions could not be decided without German
participation and approval. In an effort to maintain this prestige
we had the two Moroccan crises and the World War, in which other
factors of course entered in.
During the period from 1904 to the outbreak of the War,
the balance and center of the naval power in Europe was shifted,
as England left the burden of policing the Far East to Japan and
the Meditteranean to France and increased those unite in the home
waters
.
Among all the countries concerned there resulted a
frenzied competition in both naval and military armaments. This
1. Schmitt, B. E. op. cit. p. 225
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was largely responsible for t he feeling of mutual apprehension
and suspicion as the Entente Cordiale, transformed in 1907 into
the Triple Entente by the Anglo-Russian accord and mutually
drawn together closer by the succeeding crises, faced and chal-
lenged the Triple Alliance, the gauntlet b eing thrown into the
ring in the general conflagration of 1914.
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V. SUMMARY
The Anglo-French Entente of 1904 has been called "the
most important event of modern diplomacy." In tracing its origins
we have found it to be the outgrowth of most of the political,
economic, and national imperialistic movements of the last quarter
of the nineteenth century, with roots going even deeper into the
past and spreading out into all parts of the world.
Traditional enmity with France as t he greatest Contin-
ental power and Britain's colonial and commercial r ival for world
empire had brought the two nations into almost constant conflict.
Even after t he shattering of French political hegemony by Germany
in 1870, there was still left the Anglo-French colonial friction.
Both empires were rapidly expanding to their fullest extent and
clashing interests were inevitable.
Britain's almost unquestioned position of supremacy and
her interest in imperial and domestic problems rather than con-
tinental ones, had led to her apparent indifference and aloofness
during the earlier years of the nineteenth century. After the
awakening of feverish imperialistic aspirations on the part of
all the nations during the lastt»m decades of thecentury, Bri-
tain had found it necessary to defend and adjust her own monopoly*
This was done through a series of eolonial conferences and settle-
ments during the 'eighties and 'nineties.
The threatened encroachments of France and Russia upon
British interests led Britain to cooperate with the members of
the Triple Alliance, for they, at that time, had no ttital colonial
\
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or commercial conflicts. The efforts of Germany to make this
friendly attitude into a closerjoond failea, however, and Britain
still maintained her policy of caution toward formal binding al-
liances .
The close of the century saw a change in this policy
of isolation. Russia and France had drawn together into a Dual
Alliance and Germany, in order to neutralize its effect, was
cooperating with both members and a coalition against Great Bri-
tain was threatening. Matters between France and Britain became
acute at Fashoda and then the outbreak of the Boer War Drought the
realization that "splendid isolation" became dangerous when it
meant no friends. Allies were becoming essential and so Britain
turned first to Germany, out a combination of factors prevented
this rapprochement. Then an alliance was concluded with Japan
in 1902 which checkmated Russian aggression in the East and Bri-
tain next turned to an entente with France to settle the outstand-
ing colonial friction and provide a safeguard for growing sus-
picion against Germany.
Here we seem to have the crux of the matter. Friction
with Russia and France had been so evident and absorbing during
the last quarter century that Britain had scarcely realized the
steadily growing German competition. The marvelous economic
expansion of Germany during the years following her unification
and political hegemony on the Continent, now began to rival and
threated to undermine the British supremacy which she had enjoyed
for so long. Efficient scientific methods of production, organl-
6
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zation, and marketing gave the Germans an advantage in the world
markets. They did not actually surpass the total British trade
receipts, but the large relative increase made the British seem
to be progressing but slowly, if at all, and gave grave fears
for the future
.
The menace was not only of an economic character. Ger-
man nationalistic philosophy and aspirations dreamed of world
power. This policy of extending the political as well as the com-
mercial empire throughout the world disturbed the British imper-
ialist* who saw the necessity or defending their wide-flung do op-
inions against the challenge of a new and aggressive nation.
So long as Germany remained a land power only, Britain
had felt that she could afford to be indifferent, or at least non-
aggressive toward German diplomatic hegemony on the Continent, but
when at the turn of the century Germany began her naval activity
menacing British maritime interests, then Britain felt that the
continental balance of power must be restored as a foil. The
most obvious method of a ccomplishing this was by an understanding
with France who also fearec the growing German power.
French policy since 1370 had been to maintain the Third
Republic, to regain Alsace-Lorraine, and also her old prestige
that Germany had destroyed, by breaking out of the isolation in
which the German system of alliances had placed her. The govern-
ment came through several crises successfully and in the meanwhile
interest was found in colonial activity. This did not exclude the
desire for the revanche, but it brought France into friction
with Britain and Italy which, combined with tahe German antagonism,
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led to the formation of the Dual Alliance with Russia.
Colonial friction with Britain reached its height over
the Egyptian Sudan and France realized that further expansion was
practically impossible for either country without consent and
mutual adjustment.
Also, G-ermany was becoming a great naval power as well
as the greatest military power and the French army in cooperation
with the British navy might be the only means of an effective
check upon what they considered as the alarming growth and aggres-
siveness of the German Empire.
From unofficial commercial and also diplomatic sources,
efforts v:ere begun to prepare the way for a settlement of out-
standing difficulties which might lead to a closer understanding
between the two countries. A treaty of arbitration smoothed the
way and in Aptll 1904 was concluded the famous agreement known as
the friendly understanding or Entente Cordiale.
This settled colonial questions of friction and provided
for mutual diplomatic support. Public opinion in both countries
had been prepared for it and it was approved because (to sum up)
France recognized that with her stationary population, it was
nearly hoceless to cope with G-ermany on the land and further re-
alized that she oould better gain from Great Britain by compromise
what she could not hope to do by opposition in the colonial field.
Britain, on her side, had awakened tc the consciousness
that France was no longer the rival to be feared, but that it was
German competition which threatened British industry , commerce
,
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and challenged her control of the sea and her empire as well as
the balance of power on the Continent.
So Great Britain and France "buried the hatchet" and
the diplomatic revolution was effected, which, as its roots lay
in all parts of the world, has had world-wide results.
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